Arraignment and Pretrial Provisions

ORS 135.765
Dismissal of criminal proceeding not brought to trial within allowed time

  • exceptions


On motion of the defendant or the counsel of the defendant, or on its own motion, the court shall dismiss any criminal proceeding not brought to trial in accordance with ORS 135.763 (Trial within 90 days of notice unless continuance granted).


This section shall not apply:


When failure to bring the adult in custody to trial within 90 days after the district attorney receives notice under ORS 135.760 (Notice requesting early trial on pending charge) was the result of motions filed on behalf of the adult in custody, or of a grant by the court of a continuance on motion of the district attorney or on its own motion, for good cause shown; or


When the adult in custody is unavailable for trial, other than by imprisonment, or because of other pending criminal proceedings against the adult in custody. [Formerly 134.530; 1993 c.542 §2; 2019 c.213 §17]

See also annotations under ORS 134.530 in permanent edition.

Notes of Decisions

State may not avoid requirement of bringing defendant to trial within 90 days by voluntarily dismissing indictment then reindicting defendant. State v. Gilliland, 90 Or App 477, 752 P2d 1255 (1988)

Where neither district attorney nor defendant requested continuance under ORS 135.763, court had no authority to deny defendant's motion to dismiss when trial was not commenced within 90 days of receipt of notice. State v. Person, 113 Or App 40, 831 P2d 700 (1992), aff'd 316 Or 585, 853 P2d 813 (1993)

Dismissal of charge for failure to bring defendant to trial within 90 days must be with prejudice. State v. Waechter, 163 Or App 282, 986 P2d 1281 (1999)

Where court grants continuance at request of defense counsel, dismissal under this section of charges against defendant is not appropriate. State v. Ashcroft, 260 Or App 1, 316 P3d 355 (2013), Sup Ct review denied

§§ 135.760 to 135.773

Notes of Decisions

Where defendant, who requested speedy trial, made written motion for psychiatric examination and a continuance, state had already set trial within 90-day limit, and examination was delayed because of state hospital backlog which resulted in delay of trial beyond 90-day limit, circumstances were not sufficient to require dismissal of charges. State v. Fannin, 48 Or App 795, 617 P2d 953 (1980)

Where accusatory instrument did not exist at time defendant claims to have given written notice requesting speedy trial, notice cannot trigger statutory rights. State v. Easton, 103 Or App 184, 797 P2d 373 (1990)


Last accessed
Jun. 26, 2021