Sentencing for aggravated murder
- proceedings
- issues for jury
Source:
Section 163.150 — Sentencing for aggravated murder; proceedings; issues for jury, https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors163.html.
Notes of Decisions
Where trial record contained no “judgment of conviction,” Supreme Court granted trial court leave to enter judgment of conviction, because judgment is necessary prerequisite to review. State v. McDonnell, 306 Or 579, 761 P2d 921 (1988)
Fourth general mitigation question to be submitted to sentencing jury must allow jury to consider all aspects of defendant’s character and background whether or not causally related to offense. State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93 (1990); State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 786 P2d 161 (1990); State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 791 P2d 836 (1990); State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 839 P2d 692 (1992), on reconsideration 318 Or 28, 861 P2d 1012 (1993); State v. Tucker, 315 Or 321, 845 P2d 904 (1993)
This section does not compel resentencing before original trial jury. State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93 (1990); State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 789 P2d 1326 (1990)
Where trial court failed to give jury instruction on fourth question on subject of mitigation, case remanded to trial court for retrial of penalty phase. State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93 (1990); State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 786 P2d 111 (1990); State v. Miranda, 309 Or 121, 786 P2d 155 (1990); State v. Guzek, 310 Or 299, 797 P2d 1031 (1990); State v. Simonsen, 310 Or 412, 798 P2d 241 (1990); State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 828 P2d 1006 (1992); State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 836 P2d 1308 (1992)
Where defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, evidence that defendant had threatened one or both victims with shotgun during argument on prior occasion, evidence of prior convictions for negligent homicide and forgery and testimony regarding unadjudicated incident in 1959 and evidence of prior convictions for negligent homicide and forgery were properly presented to jury during penalty stage. State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 786 P2d 111 (1990)
Trial court’s instructions to jury that they could not have sympathy for defendant in deliberations on penalty phase were proper because role of jury is to reach reasoned decision based solely on evidence before jury. State v. Moen, 309 Or 45, 786 P2d 111 (1990)
Where defendant failed to give any basis for trial court to take judicial notice that violence lessens with age, that violence is situational, or to make specific comment on evidence about defendant’s family or drug abuse, it would have been error for trial court to specifically instruct jury on these mitigating factors. State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 786 P2d 161 (1990)
Temporal gap between guilt and penalty phases in death penalty case created by this section is not unconstitutional. State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 786 P2d 161 (1990)
Evidence that defendant had committed prior abduction and rape in 1980, offered to show defendant’s intent to commit crime of attempted rape, was not properly admitted because similarities of two crimes did not outweigh differences. State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 785 P2d 350 (1990)
Evidentiary provisions against character evidence and against uncorroborated confessions are not applicable because evidence is allowable as relevant to issue of future dangerousness. State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 789 P2d 1352 (1990)
Issues considered during penalty phase do not determine guilt or impose new or different sanction and therefore are not double jeopardy. State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 789 P2d 1352 (1990)
Absent evidence making it relevant, trial court should not instruct jury on possible release of persons sentenced to life in prison. State v. Simonsen, 310 Or 412, 798 P2d 241 (1990); State v. Douglas, 310 Or 438, 800 P2d 288 (1990)
It was error in aggravated murder case, albeit harmless error, for court to allow prosecutor to ask potential jurors during voir dire regarding their willingness to consider in penalty phase of proceedings whether defendant had past criminal history for purpose of assessing probability of defendant’s future dangerousness. State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 806 P2d 110 (1991)
Where defendant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, evidence of previous murder, admitted under modus operandi exception to general rule against introduction of evidence of “other crimes,” was erroneously admitted and prejudicial to defendant. State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 832 P2d 443 (1992)
Sentencing jury’s verdict in earlier murder trial involving same defendant did not preclude state from relitigating issue of defendant’s future dangerousness and seeking death penalty in later case. State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 836 P2d 1308 (1992)
Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury that “criminal acts of violence” referred to relatively narrow range of conduct likely to result in physical injury to persons, including homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault and arson. State v. Tucker, 315 Or 321, 845 P2d 904 (1993)
Because this section establishes clear, rational and definite criteria for determining whether defendant should receive life sentence or death penalty, this section is not unconstitutional under Article I, section 20. State v. Tucker, 315 Or 321, 845 P2d 904 (1993)
Admission of victim impact evidence was improper because victim impact is not relevant to presence or absence of mitigating circumstances. State v. Metz, 131 Or App 706, 887 P2d 795 (1994), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 906 P2d 272 (1995). But see State v. Guzek, 336 Or 424, 86 P3d 1106 (2004)
Circumstantial evidence that defendant’s execution might have some harmful effect on defendant’s daughter is relevant during penalty phase to defendant’s character or background under fourth general mitigation question. State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 879 P2d 162 (1994)
Where defendant is interrogated about criminal conduct unrelated to charged murder, evidence of unrelated criminal conduct derived during interrogation may not be used to enhance sentence for murder unless defense counsel was afforded opportunity to be present at interrogation. State v. Hill, 142 Or App 189, 921 P2d 969 (1996), Sup Ct review denied
Unadjudicated bad acts of defendant while incarcerated are admissible because relevant to issue of future dangerousness. State v. Williams, 322 Or 620, 912 P2d 364 (1996)
During penalty phase of trial, lay opinion of witness whether defendant should receive death penalty was irrelevant. State v. Wright, 323 Or 8, 913 P2d 321 (1996)
Evidence presented during second penalty-phase hearing that duplicates evidence at trial is not “repetitive evidence” where jury is not same as trial jury. State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 927 P2d 64 (1996)
Evidence of defendant’s prior parole violations is admissible because relevant to future dangerousness. State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 927 P2d 64 (1996)
Appellate court may review jury’s decision under fourth question to determine whether rational juror could have concluded that death sentence is justified. State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 927 P2d 1073 (1996)
New penalty-phase proceeding on remand is treated as separate trial for purposes of holding omnibus hearing and allowing state appeals therefrom prior to trial. State ex rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 956 P2d 202 (1998)
Retroactive application of 1995 amendments allowing consideration of victim impact evidence at sentencing violated ex post facto prohibition of Oregon Constitution. State v. Metz, 162 Or App 448, 986 P2d 714 (1999), Sup Ct review denied. But seeState v. Guzek, 336 Or 424, 86 P3d 1106 (2004)
Under 1993 version of statute, availability of new sentencing option upon remand was governed by applicability date in provision governing remand proceedings, not applicability date of sentencing option provision. State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 4 P3d 1261 (2000)
Prosecution has right to present rebuttal argument regarding any penalty-phase matter raised by defendant’s argument, including whether death penalty should be imposed. State v. McNeely, 330 Or 457, 8 P3d 212 (2000)
1997 version of statute permitting jury consideration of aggravating evidence did not allow cruel and unusual punishment since jury could consider only evidence presented at trial. State v. Fanus, 336 Or 63, 79 P3d 847 (2003)
Where defendant has engaged in past dangerous conduct based on defendant’s beliefs, evidence relating to beliefs is relevant to issue of future dangerousness. State v. Fanus, 336 Or 63, 79 P3d 847 (2003)
Presentation of evidence pertaining to personal characteristics of victim or impact of crime on victim’s family is not limited to testimony by victim or family. State v. Sparks, 336 Or 298, 83 P3d 304 (2004)
Use of victim impact evidence regarding crime committed before 1995 and 1997 amendments making evidence admissible does not violate federal ex post facto protection and supersedes state ex post facto protection. State v. Guzek, 336 Or 424, 86 P3d 1106 (2004)
During penalty-phase proceeding, guilt-phase transcripts are admissible regardless of substance. State v. Guzek, 336 Or 424, 86 P3d 1106 (2004)
Where defendant waives ex post facto challenges, court must instruct jury during penalty phase of trial regarding sentencing option not available at time defendant committed crime. State v. Guzek, 336 Or 424, 86 P3d 1106 (2004)
Where transcripts of witness testimony from guilt phase of trial were used to prove elements of state’s case during penalty phase of trial, defendant had right to introduce prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes. State v. Guzek, 336 Or 424, 86 P3d 1106 (2004)
1997 amendments requiring that jury be instructed to consider aggravating evidence did not alter evidence required to be considered so as to trigger state or federal constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. State v. Acremant, 338 Or 302, 108 P3d 1139 (2005)
Questions regarding probability of defendant’s future dangerousness and whether defendant should receive death sentence do not unconstitutionally reduce standard of proof. State v. Longo, 341 Or 580, 148 P3d 892 (2006)
Where death penalty is not under consideration, evidence of potential for future violence is relevant to consideration of whether sufficient mitigating circumstances warrant life sentence with possibility of parole. State v. Ramsey, 215 Or App 434, 173 P3d 142 (2007), Sup Ct review denied
Submission of four issues to jury for sentencing determination applies only where all three sentencing options are under consideration. State v. Ramsey, 215 Or App 434, 173 P3d 142 (2007), Sup Ct review denied
Law Review Citations
22 WLR 285 (1986); 25 WLR 653 (1989); 70 OLR 943 (1991); 29 WLR 113, 343 (1993); 36 WLR 313 (2000); 39 WLR 1 (2003)
Up to date