Actions and Suits in Particular Cases

ORS 30.295
Payment of judgment or settlement

  • remedies for nonpayment
  • tax levy for payment
  • installment payments


(1)

When a judgment is entered against or a settlement is made by a public body for a claim within the scope of ORS 30.260 (Definitions for ORS 30.260 to 30.300) to 30.300 (ORS 30.260 to 30.300 exclusive), including claims against officers, employees or agents required to be indemnified under ORS 30.285 (Public body shall indemnify public officers), payment shall be made and the same remedies shall apply in case of nonpayment as in the case of other judgments or settlements against the public body except as otherwise provided in this section.

(2)

If the public body is authorized to levy taxes that could be used to satisfy a judgment or settlement within the scope of ORS 30.260 (Definitions for ORS 30.260 to 30.300) to 30.300 (ORS 30.260 to 30.300 exclusive), and it has, by resolution, declared that the following conditions exist, interest shall accrue on the judgment or settlement, but the same shall not be due and payable until after the canvass and certification of an election upon a special tax levy for purposes of satisfying the judgment or settlement:

(a)

The amount of the judgment or settlement would exceed amounts budgeted for contingencies, tort claims and projected surplus in the current budget;

(b)

The amount of the judgment or settlement would exceed 10 percent of the total of the next fiscal year’s projected revenues that are not restricted as to use, including the maximum amount of general property tax that could be levied without election but excluding any levy for debt service;

(c)

Payment of the judgment or settlement within less than a certain number of years would seriously impair the ability of the public body to carry out its responsibilities as a unit of government; and

(d)

The public body has passed an appropriate ordinance or resolution calling a special election to submit to its electors a special levy in an amount sufficient to satisfy the judgment or settlement.

(3)

A certified copy of the resolution provided for in subsection (2) of this section shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which an order permitting installment payments could be entered.

(4)

If the public body is not authorized to levy taxes as provided in subsection (2) of this section, and it has, by resolution, declared that the applicable conditions specified in subsection (2)(a) to (c) of this section exist, it may petition for an order permitting installment payments as provided in subsection (6) of this section.

(5)

(a) The provisions of subsections (2) and (4) of this section do not apply to the State of Oregon.

(b)

Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, if the conditions specified in subsection (4) of this section exist, the Secretary of State may, under Seal of the State of Oregon, attest thereto in lieu of a resolution, and the State of Oregon may thereafter petition for an order permitting installment payments as provided in subsection (6) of this section.

(6)

If the procedure specified in subsections (2) to (5) of this section has been followed, and, with respect to public bodies subject to subsection (2) of this section, the tax levy failed, the public body may petition for an order permitting installment payments. The petition shall be filed in the court in which judgment was entered or, if no judgment has been entered, it shall be filed in the circuit court of the judicial district in which the public body has its legal situs. Petitions by the State of Oregon when no judgment has been entered shall be filed in Marion County Circuit Court.

(7)

The court in which a petition is filed shall order that the judgment or settlement be paid in quarterly, semiannual or annual installments over a period of time not to exceed 10 years. The court shall determine the term of years based upon the ability of the public body to effectively carry out its governmental responsibilities, and shall not allow a longer term than appears reasonably necessary to meet that need. The order permitting installment payments shall provide for annual interest at the judgment rate. [1967 c.627 §9; 1977 c.823 §4; 2005 c.22 §20]

Law Review Citations

50 WLR 619 (2014)

§§ 30.260 to 30.300

Notes of Decisions

Dismissal of action for personal injuries was improper where based solely upon allegations of complaint and allegations did not state sufficient facts for court to determine whether particular governmental act was discretionary function or duty. Hulen v. City of Hermiston, 30 Or App 1141, 569 P2d 665 (1977)

Where plaintiff was mistakenly arrested following computer retrieval of identifying and locator data for individual of similar name, demurrer as to three of defendants was properly sustained because plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts from which duty to plaintiff could be discerned, and summary judgment as to two of defendants was improperly allowed because affidavits did not reveal whether defendant's acts were discretionary or ministerial. Murphy v. City of Portland, 36 Or App 745, 585 P2d 732 (1978)

Complaint allegation that plaintiff submitted application for building permit in proper form was sufficient to allow prosecution of claim against public officer. Dykeman v. State, 39 Or App 629, 593 P2d 1183 (1979)

Even if Children's Services Division's failure to follow required APA rulemaking procedures could constitute tort within meaning of these sections, CSD was immune from tort liability under ORS 30.265 (3)(f) where it terminated its benefit program without prior rulemaking procedures. Burke v. Children's Services Division, 288 Or 533, 607 P2d 141 (1980)

Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981 are subject to two-year statute of limitations of Tort Claims Act. Loiseau v. Dept. of Human Resources, 558 F Supp 521 (1983)

Where police officer pursued plaintiff in marked police car with lights and siren activated in area defendant was assigned to patrol, with no known motive other than to fulfill duty as police officer, trial court was correct in concluding that defendant was acting in course and scope of employment, despite plaintiff's claim that defendant's acts were excessive. Brungardt v. Barton, 69 Or App 440, 685 P2d 1021 (1984)

Plaintiff in 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought under the Oregon Tort Claims Act against municipality for actions of its employes need not show that employes acted according to "custom or usage" as in federal §1983 action. Haase v. City of Eugene, 85 Or App 107, 735 P2d 1258 (1987)

Limitations of Oregon Tort Claims Act do not apply to claims brought in state court alleging violation of federal Civil Rights Act. Rogers v. Saylor, 306 Or 267, 760 P2d 232 (1988)

Mayor was immune from liability in tort claim under this section where former chief of police brought tort action in connection with her removal from office. Harrington v. City of Portland, 708 F Supp 1561 (D. Or. 1988)

Where plaintiffs brought action under 42 U.S.C 1983 and this section after defendant Children's Services Division employees removed plaintiff's child from home following reports of abuse, defendants are entitled to absolute immunity under this section for their discretionary acts as provided by ORS 30.265 (3). Tennyson v. Children's Services Division, 308 Or 80, 775 P2d 1365 (1989)

There is no legislative purpose to extend definition of "agent" to control to include ostensible agent when doctrine of apparent authority is intended to achieve different purpose. Giese v. Bay Area Health District, 101 Or App 410, 790 P2d 1198 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Because there was evidence that resident was not hospital's agent in first place, fact that "loaned servant" doctrine does not eliminate agency relationship between hospital and employee who assists physician in surgery did not give plaintiff grounds for directed verdict. Shepard v. Sisters of Providence, 102 Or App 196, 793 P2d 1384 (1990)

Completed Citations

State Forester v. Umpqua R. Nav. Co., 258 Or 10, 478 P2d 631 (1970), cert. denied, 404 US 826 (1971)

Atty. Gen. Opinions

Liability of members of the State Water Resources Board for damages of party adversely affected by reclassification, (1972) Vol 36, p 250; faculty members scope of employment, (1975) Vol 37, p 911; state liability for negligent operation by drivers of state-owned vehicles in authorized car pool, (1978) Vol 39, p 101; State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation as public body, (1980) Vol 40, p 344; Use of Liability Fund balances to pay cost of claims for which date of loss precedes authorized implementation date of state self-insurance program, (1981) Vol 41, p 329; Department of Veterans Affairs fee appraisers and inspectors as agents of state for purposes of tort liability, (1981) Vol 42, p 103; CPAs and PAs volunteering services to investigate and review complaints against accountancy licensees as employes or agents of public body, (1983) Vol 43, p 145; Cause of action under Oregon Tort Claims Act for declarative or injunctive relief or for violation of federal statute,

(1985) Vol. 44, p 416; Oregon Medical Insurance Pool, board, members, employes and agents immune from tort claims, (1989) Vol 46, p 155; director and other state employes are covered by Oregon Tort Claims Act, (1989) Vol 46, p 155; various persons have immunity from prosecution for criminal acts committed in carrying out pool programs, (1989) Vol 46, p 155

Law Review Citations

53 OLR 371 (1974); 23 WLR 493, 507 (1987); 69 OLR 157 (1990); 38 WLR 657 (2002); 50 WLR 619 (2014)


Source

Last accessed
Jun. 26, 2021