Limitations of Actions and Suits

ORS 12.010
Time of commencing actions

Actions shall only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by statute. [Amended by 1979 c.284 §43]
Note: Sections 7 and 8 (2), chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first special session), provide:
Sec. 7. Extension of time to commence action during COVID-19 state of emergency. (1) If the expiration of the time to commence an action or give notice of a claim falls within the time in which any declaration of a state of emergency issued by the Governor related to COVID-19, and any extension of the declaration, is in effect, or within 90 days after the declaration and any extension is no longer in effect, the expiration of the time to commence the action or give notice of the claim is extended to a date 90 days after the declaration and any extension is no longer in effect.

(2)

Subsection (1) of this section applies to:

(a)

Time periods for commencing an action established in ORS chapter 12;

(b)

The time period for commencing an action for wrongful death established in ORS 30.020 (Action for wrongful death);

(c)

The time period for commencing an action or giving a notice of claim under ORS 30.275 (Notice of claim); and

(d)

Any other time limitation for the commencement of a civil cause of action or the giving of notice of a civil claim established by statute.

(3)

Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to:

(a)

Time limitations for the commencement of criminal actions;

(b)

The initiation of an appeal to the magistrate division of the Oregon Tax Court or an appeal from the magistrate division to the regular division;

(c)

The initiation of an appeal or judicial review proceeding in the Court of Appeals; or

(d)

The initiation of any type of case or proceeding in the Supreme Court.

(4)

Subsection (1) of this section applies to expirations of the time to commence an action or give notice of a claim occurring:

(a)

On or after March 8, 2020, and on or before the date 90 days after the declaration of a state of emergency issued by the Governor on March 8, 2020, and any extension of the declaration, is no longer in effect; or

(b)

During the time in which any other declaration of a state of emergency issued by the Governor related to COVID-19, and any extension of the declaration, is in effect, or within 90 days after the declaration and any extension is no longer in effect. [2020 s.s.1 c.12 §7; 2021 c.499 §1]
Sec. 8. (2) Section 7, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first special session), is repealed on December 31, 2021. [2020 s.s.1 c.12 §8; 2021 c.199 §3(2)]

Notes of Decisions

Unless expressly provided otherwise, where statutory amendment reduces time for bringing action, reduction does not act to cut off rights accrued under old law. Bower Trucking and Warehouse Co. v. Multnomah County, 35 Or App 427, 582 P2d 439 (1978)

Where allegedly libelous memorandum was confidential in nature and initial publication was not of type plaintiff would be presumed to know about, cause of action was deemed to accrue at time plaintiff discovered existence of memorandum. White v. Gurnsey, 48 Or App 931, 618 P2d 975 (1980)

In action for alleged occupational disease (asbestosis), it was error for trial court to conclude as matter of law that action accrued under this section and ORS 12.110 in December 1975 where medical report in October indicated plaintiff’s condition “should improve without medication” and record amply reflected possibility plaintiff did not know what was causing his illness. Lundy v. Union Carbide Corp., 695 F2d 394 (1982)

Claim for occupational disease accrues when “reasonably prudent person associates his symptoms with a serious or permanent condition and at the same time perceives the role which the defendant has played in inducing that condition. Lundy v. Union Carbide Corp., 695 F2d 394 (1982), citing Schiele v. Hobart, 284 Or 483, 587 P2d 1010 (1979)

Statute of limitations for tort of intentional interference with contractual relationship does not depend on date of discovery of interference but rather when damages accrued. Cramer v. Stonebridge Inn, 77 Or App 407, 713 P2d 645 (1986)

Determination as to whether action is “commenced within periods prescribed in this chapter” is subject to ORS 174.120 method of computing limitation period. Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 963 P2d 678 (1998)

Source

Last accessed
May 26, 2023

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