Definitions with respect to culpability
Source:
Section 161.085 — Definitions with respect to culpability, https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors161.html.
Notes of Decisions
One cannot “attempt” a crime involving an element of recklessness. State v. Smith, 21 Or App 270, 534 P2d 1180 (1975), Sup Ct review denied
Concepts of “intent” and “knowledge” are distinct and instruction worded in terms of “intent” should not be given in prosecution for crime where indictment alleges “knowledge.” State v. Francis, 284 Or 621, 588 P2d 611 (1978)
In trial for first degree rape, it was not error for court to fail to give defendant’s instruction on statutory definition of “knowingly” under this section where court did instruct jury on state’s burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt and on giving words not specifically defined in instructions their generally known and understood meanings. State v. Bunyea, 44 Or App 611, 606 P2d 685 (1980)
When combined with criminal negligence standard of this section, term “adequate physical care” in ORS 163.200 (criminal mistreatment in second degree) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Damofle/Quintana, 89 Or App 620, 750 P2d 518 (1988), Sup Ct review denied
Where defendant’s motive was not relevant to issue of whether he acted “with intent” to conspire to commit crime of burglary or “knowingly” in committing crime of burglary and theft under OEC 401, proffered evidence was not admissible as evidence of defendant’s state of mind. State v. Troen, 100 Or App 442, 786 P2d 751 (1990), Sup Ct review denied
Trial court did not err in refusing to give requested jury instruction that defined “conscious” because term is understandable without elaboration. State v. McDonnell, 313 Or 478, 837 P2d 941 (1992)
Definition of “intentionally” also applies to intentional murder under ORS 163.115 and aggravated felony murder under ORS 163.095. State v. Wille, 317 Or 487, 858 P2d 128 (1993)
Result or circumstance defining offense committed by person acting “recklessly” is specific to offense, therefore reckless action regarding one offense does not demonstrate reckless action regarding related offense. State v. Merideth, 149 Or App 164, 942 P2d 803 (1997), Sup Ct review denied
Speech is sufficient bodily movement to constitute “voluntary act” and thus is “conduct.” State v. Jessen, 162 Or App 662, 986 P2d 684 (1999), Sup Ct review denied
Definition for “knowingly” addresses only awareness of conduct or existence of specified circumstances, not result of conduct. State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 986 P2d 1160 (1999)
“Voluntary act” requires that defendant have ability to choose whether to take particular action. State v. Tippetts, 180 Or App 350, 43 P3d 455 (2002)
Whether defendant accused of acting recklessly was aware of and consciously disregarded circumstances existing at time of event is fact-specific inquiry for which general standards of care are irrelevant. State v. Curtiss, 193 Or App 348, 89 P3d 1262 (2004), Sup Ct review denied
For purpose of determining whether manner of driving constituted criminal negligence, standard of care reasonable person would observe is based on conditions actually existing at time. State v. Fruitts, 290 Or App 222, 414 P3d 881 (2018), Sup Ct review denied
Law Review Citations
51 OLR 463, 609, 616 (1972)
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