General Provisions

ORS 161.085
Definitions with respect to culpability


As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, and ORS 166.635 (Discharging weapon or throwing objects at trains), unless the context requires otherwise:

(1)

“Act” means a bodily movement.

(2)

“Voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously and includes the conscious possession or control of property.

(3)

“Omission” means a failure to perform an act the performance of which is required by law.

(4)

“Conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

(5)

“To act” means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act.

(6)

“Culpable mental state” means intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence as these terms are defined in subsections (7), (8), (9) and (10) of this section.

(7)

“Intentionally” or “with intent,” when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described.

(8)

“Knowingly” or “with knowledge,” when used with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with an awareness that the conduct of the person is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so described exists.

(9)

“Recklessly,” when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.

(10)

“Criminal negligence” or “criminally negligent,” when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. [1971 c.743 §7; 1973 c.139 §2]
Note: See note under 161.015 (General definitions).

Notes of Decisions

One cannot "attempt" a crime involving an element of recklessness. State v. Smith, 21 Or App 270, 534 P2d 1180 (1975), Sup Ct review denied

Concepts of "intent" and "knowledge" are distinct and instruction worded in terms of "intent" should not be given in prosecution for crime where indictment alleges "knowledge." State v. Francis, 284 Or 621, 588 P2d 611 (1978)

In trial for first degree rape, it was not error for court to fail to give defendant's instruction on statutory definition of "knowingly" under this section where court did instruct jury on state's burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt and on giving words not specifically defined in instructions their generally known and understood meanings. State v. Bunyea, 44 Or App 611, 606 P2d 685 (1980)

When combined with criminal negligence standard of this section, term "adequate physical care" in ORS 163.200 (criminal mistreatment in second degree) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Damofle/Quintana, 89 Or App 620, 750 P2d 518 (1988), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant's motive was not relevant to issue of whether he acted "with intent" to conspire to commit crime of burglary or "knowingly" in committing crime of burglary and theft under OEC 401, proffered evidence was not admissible as evidence of defendant's state of mind. State v. Troen, 100 Or App 442, 786 P2d 751 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Trial court did not err in refusing to give requested jury instruction that defined "conscious" because term is understandable without elaboration. State v. McDonnell, 313 Or 478, 837 P2d 941 (1992)

Definition of "intentionally" also applies to intentional murder under ORS 163.115 and aggravated felony murder under ORS 163.095. State v. Wille, 317 Or 487, 858 P2d 128 (1993)

Result or circumstance defining offense committed by person acting "recklessly" is specific to offense, therefore reckless action regarding one offense does not demonstrate reckless action regarding related offense. State v. Merideth, 149 Or App 164, 942 P2d 803 (1997), Sup Ct review denied

Speech is sufficient bodily movement to constitute "voluntary act" and thus is "conduct." State v. Jessen, 162 Or App 662, 986 P2d 684 (1999), Sup Ct review denied

Definition for "knowingly" addresses only awareness of conduct or existence of specified circumstances, not result of conduct. State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 986 P2d 1160 (1999)

"Voluntary act" requires that defendant have ability to choose whether to take particular action. State v. Tippetts, 180 Or App 350, 43 P3d 455 (2002)

Whether defendant accused of acting recklessly was aware of and consciously disregarded circumstances existing at time of event is fact-specific inquiry for which general standards of care are irrelevant. State v. Curtiss, 193 Or App 348, 89 P3d 1262 (2004), Sup Ct review denied

For purpose of determining whether manner of driving constituted criminal negligence, standard of care reasonable person would observe is based on conditions actually existing at time. State v. Fruitts, 290 Or App 222, 414 P3d 881 (2018)

Law Review Citations

51 OLR 463, 609, 616 (1972)

§§ 161.085 to 161.125

Law Review Citations

51 OLR 427, 437, 459 (1972); 29 WLR 829 (1993)

Chapter 161

Notes of Decisions

A juvenile court adjudication of whether or not a child committed acts which would be a criminal violation if committed by an adult must necessarily include an adjudication of all affirmative defenses that would be available to an adult being tried for the same criminal violation. State ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. L.J., 26 Or App 461, 552 P2d 1322 (1976)

Law Review Citations

2 EL 237 (1971); 51 OLR 427-637 (1972)

Chapter 161

Criminal Code

(Generally)

Notes of Decisions

Legislature's adoption of 1971 Criminal Code did not abolish doctrine of transferred intent. State v. Wesley, 254 Or App 697, 295 P3d 1147 (2013), Sup Ct review denied


Source

Last accessed
Jun. 26, 2021