General Provisions

ORS 161.685
Effect of nonpayment of fines, restitution or costs

  • report to consumer reporting agency
  • rules


When a defendant who has been sentenced or ordered to pay a fine, or to make restitution, defaults on a payment or installment ordered by the court, the court on motion of the district attorney or upon its own motion may require the defendant to show cause why the default should not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest for the appearance of the defendant.


If the court finds that the default constitutes contempt, the court may impose one or more of the sanctions authorized by ORS 33.105 (Sanctions authorized).


When a fine or an order of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, it is the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation or association to pay the fine or make the restitution from those assets, and if that person fails to do so, the court may hold that person in contempt.


Notwithstanding ORS 33.105 (Sanctions authorized), the term of confinement for contempt for nonpayment of fines or failure to make restitution shall be set forth in the commitment order, and shall not exceed one day for each $25 of the fine or restitution, 30 days if the fine or order of restitution was imposed upon conviction of a violation or misdemeanor, or one year in any other case, whichever is the shorter period.


If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment of a fine or restitution is not contempt, the court may enter an order allowing the defendant additional time for payment, reducing the amount of the payment or installments due on the payment, or revoking the fine or order of restitution in whole or in part.


A default in the payment of a fine or costs or failure to make restitution or a default on an installment on a fine, costs or restitution may be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The levy of execution or garnishment for the collection of a fine or restitution shall not discharge a defendant confined for contempt until the amount of the fine or restitution has actually been collected.


The court, or the court clerk if ordered by the court, may report a default on a court-ordered payment to a consumer reporting agency.


The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall adopt rules under ORS 1.002 (Supreme Court) establishing policies and procedures for reporting a default under subsection (7) of this section to a consumer reporting agency that may include, but are not limited to, limitations on reporting a default to a consumer reporting agency.


Except as otherwise provided in this section, proceedings under this section shall be conducted:


As provided in ORS 33.055 (Procedure for imposition of remedial sanctions), if the court seeks to impose remedial sanctions as described in ORS 33.015 (Definitions for ORS 33.015 to 33.155) to 33.155 (Applicability); and


As provided in ORS 33.065 (Procedure for imposition of punitive sanctions), if the court seeks to impose punitive sanctions as described in ORS 33.015 (Definitions for ORS 33.015 to 33.155) to 33.155 (Applicability).


Confinement under this section may be custody or incarceration, whether actual or constructive.


As used in this section:


“Consumer reporting agency” means any person that regularly engages for fees, dues, or on a nonprofit basis, in whole or in part, in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.


“Restitution” has the meaning given that term in ORS 137.103 (Definitions for ORS 137.101 to 137.109). [1971 c.743 §82; 1977 c.371 §5; 1987 c.709 §3; 1987 c.873 §28; 1991 c.724 §27a; 1995 c.79 §50; 1995 c.512 §4; 2015 c.9 §3]

Notes of Decisions

The Oregon recoupment scheme does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 US 40, 40 L Ed 2d 642, 94 S Ct 2116 (1974)

Evidence, that defendant either had income during 9-month period of nonpayment of fine or that he could have sought employment to produce income during such period, was sufficient to support finding that defendant did not make good faith effort to pay fine. State v. Meyer, 31 Or App 775, 571 P2d 550 (1977)

Court had no authority under this section to impose determinate sentence. State v. Benton, 101 Or App 386, 790 P2d 1191 (1990); 102 Or App 585, 795 P2d 601 (1990), aff'd 311 Or 295, 810 P2d 851 (1991)

Because this provision does not authorize determinate sentence, provision is about civil, not criminal contempt so trial procedures did not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or right to due process. State v. Benton, 102 Or App 585, 795 P2d 601 (1990), aff'd 311 Or 295, 810 P2d 851 (1991)

Authorization to collect fine upon default is permissive and does not create requirement that default occur prior to collection efforts. Wilkins v. Frink, 158 Or App 76, 971 P2d 494 (1999), Sup Ct review denied

Law Review Citations

11 WLJ 288, 291 (1975); 55 OLR 101 (1976)

§§ 161.665 to 161.685

Notes of Decisions

Fees of appointed defense attorneys and investigation expenses are "costs" which are assessable to defendant as part of sentence. State v. Fuller, 12 Or App 152, 504 P2d 1393 (1973), Sup Ct review denied, aff'd 40 L Ed 2d 642, 94 S Ct 2116

When sentence is imposed and defendant has commenced service of that sentence, trial court's jurisdiction to supplement it by amendment is exhausted. State v. Olson, 22 Or App 344, 539 P2d 166 (1975)

As a condition of probation, the defendant may be required to pay for the state's witness fees but not juror's fees. State v. Hastings, 24 Or App 123, 544 P2d 590 (1976)

Prevailing party fee cannot be included as part of costs incurred by state and chargeable to convicted criminal defendant. State v. Marino, 25 Or App 817, 551 P2d 131 (1976)

Due process requires that defendant be afforded notice that costs may be imposed, and be given opportunity to be heard on whether imposition of costs is appropriate. Stacey v. State of Oregon, 30 Or App 1075, 569 P2d 640 (1977)

Expense of transporting defendant to Oregon after waiver of extradition was cost "specially incurred by state in prosecuting defendant" and was properly assessed as part of sentence. State v. Armstrong, 44 Or App 219, 605 P2d 736 (1980), Sup Ct review denied

Criminal defendant can be required to pay costs incurred by state following filing of felony information against him in district court. State v. Haynes, 61 Or App 43, 655 P2d 621 (1982), Sup Ct review denied

Court should consider defendant's ability to pay and financial resources before imposing obligation to reimburse state for costs of trial. State v. Armstrong, 71 Or App 467, 692 P2d 699 (1984)

If expenses would not be recoverable by Department of Justice, they are not made recoverable by billing them to another agency. State v. Heston, 74 Or App 631, 704 P2d 541 (1985)

Law Review Citations

11 WLJ 284, 288, 289, 291 (1975); 55 OLR 101 (1976)

§§ 161.605 to 161.685

Law Review Citations

51 OLR 433, 476, 489 (1972)

Chapter 161

Notes of Decisions

A juvenile court adjudication of whether or not a child committed acts which would be a criminal violation if committed by an adult must necessarily include an adjudication of all affirmative defenses that would be available to an adult being tried for the same criminal violation. State ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. L.J., 26 Or App 461, 552 P2d 1322 (1976)

Law Review Citations

2 EL 237 (1971); 51 OLR 427-637 (1972)

Chapter 161

Criminal Code


Notes of Decisions

Legislature's adoption of 1971 Criminal Code did not abolish doctrine of transferred intent. State v. Wesley, 254 Or App 697, 295 P3d 1147 (2013), Sup Ct review denied


Last accessed
Jun. 26, 2021