ORS 166.155
Bias crime in the second degree


(1)

A person commits a bias crime in the second degree if the person:

(a)

Tampers or interferes with property, having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that the person has such right, with the intent to cause substantial inconvenience to another person because of the person’s perception of the other person’s race, color, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability or national origin;

(b)

Intentionally subjects another person to offensive physical contact because of the person’s perception of the other person’s race, color, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability or national origin; or

(c)

Intentionally, because of the person’s perception of race, color, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability or national origin of another person or of a member of the other person’s family, subjects the other person to alarm by threatening:

(A)

To inflict serious physical injury upon or to commit a felony affecting the other person, or a member of the other person’s family; or

(B)

To cause substantial damage to the property of the other person or of a member of the other person’s family.

(2)

A bias crime in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.

(3)

As used in this section and ORS 166.165 (Bias crime in the first degree):

(a)

“Gender identity” means an individual’s gender-related identity, appearance, expression or behavior, regardless of whether the identity, appearance, expression or behavior differs from that associated with the gender assigned to the individual at birth.

(b)

“Property” means any tangible personal property or real property. [1981 c.785 §1; 1983 c.521 §1; 1989 c.1029 §1; 2007 c.100 §18; 2011 c.421 §1; 2019 c.553 §1]

Notes of Decisions

It is constitutionally permissible to punish otherwise criminal conduct more severely when it is motivated by racial, ethnic or religious hatred than when it is motivated by individual animosity. State v. Beebe, 67 Or App 738, 680 P2d 11 (1984), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant and another were charged and jointly tried for intimidation in first degree and other person was acquitted, defendant could be convicted and sentenced only for intimidation in second degree. State v. Martin, 109 Or App 483, 818 P2d 1301 (1991)

Law Review Citations

18 WLR 197 (1982); 28 WLR 455 (1992); 71 OLR 689 (1992); 72 OLR 157 (1993)

Chapter 166

Law Review Citations

51 OLR 427-637 (1972); 69 OLR 169 (1990)


Source
Last accessed
May. 15, 2020