Offenses Against Public Order
Bias crime in the first degree
Notes of Decisions
State need not prove that defendant was motivated solely by defendant’s perception of victim’s race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation because this statute creates criminal liability when unlawful motive plays any role in proscribed conduct. State v. Hendrix, 107 Or App 734, 813 P2d 1115 (1991), aff’d State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992) and State v. Hendrix, 314 Or 170, 838 P2d 566 (1992)
This statute is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Hendrix, 107 Or App 734, 813 P2d 1115 (1991), aff’d State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992)
Where defendant and another were charged and jointly tried for intimidation in first degree and other person was acquitted, defendant could be convicted and sentenced only for intimidation in second degree. State v. Martin, 109 Or App 483, 818 P2d 1301 (1991)
Because this section does not proscribe opinions or communications, it does not violate Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 8. State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992)
When defendant arrived at store with codefendants who had weapons, observed that one victim spoke little English, heard codefendant’s loud and repeated statements about victims’ race and national origin, continued to beat victims while hearing and after hearing codefendants’ statements and left with codefendants after beating, evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had specific intent required under this section. State v. Hendrix, 314 Or 170, 838 P2d 566 (1992)
Law Review Citations
18 WLR 197 (1982); 28 WLR 455 (1992); 71 OLR 689 (1992); 72 OLR 157 (1993); 29 WLR 763 (1993)