Definitions for ORS 243.650 to 243.809

Amended by HB 4115
Effective since April 4, 2024
Relating to employment classification of certain strike-prohibited employees; amending ORS 243.650 and 243.682; and declaring an emergency.
Source:
Section 243.650 — Definitions for ORS 243.650 to 243.809, https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors243.html
.
See also annotations under ORS 243.711 in permanent edition.
Notes of Decisions
The selection of a fair-share ratification procedure need only be some procedure which reasonably reflects the opinion of the majority of the bargaining unit members. Oregon City Fedn. of Teachers v. Employe Relations Bd., 23 Or App 540, 543 P2d 297 (1975)
A court’s review of the Employment Relations Board’s decision as to what is a mandatory subject for collective bargaining is limited to determining whether the decision is lawful in substance and is supported by substantial evidence. Springfield Educ. Assn. v. Springfield Sch. Dist. 19, 24 Or App 751, 547 P2d 647 (1976), as modified by 25 Or App 407, 549 P2d 1141 (1976)
Substitute teachers are public employes within definition of this section. Eugene School District v. Substitute Teacher Organization, 31 Or App 1255, 572 P2d 650 (1977)
In a proceeding before the Employment Relations Board to certify a bargaining unit, an order by the board denying a motion to dismiss such a proceeding on the ground that the employer is not a “public employer” and holding that it is, to the contrary, a “public employer,” is not a “final order” so as to be appealable under the terms of ORS 183.480. Lane Council of Governments v. Lane Council of Governments Employes Association, 277 Or 631, 561 P2d 1012 (1977), on reconsideration 278 Or 335, 563 P2d 729 (1977)
Notwithstanding that it was improper for public employer to classify employe as “supervisory employe,” and thus place him on list of positions excluded from collective bargaining, without first giving notice to union as required by bargaining agreement, employe was not then entitled to disobey order not to attend union meeting, but was required to remain at job and then file grievance under procedure provided by bargaining agreement. Whitney v. Employment Division, 280 Or 35, 569 P2d 1078 (1977)
Sheriff is “public employer” within meaning of this section. Hockema v. OSEA, 34 Or App 527, 579 P2d 282 (1978), Sup Ct review denied
Where collective bargaining agreement included provision requiring fair share payments-in-lieu-of-dues, and it was intent of parties to agreement that vote approving of agreement would constitute ratification of fair share requirement, subsequent judicial decision mandating separate vote for ratification of fair share provision was not retroactive and did not require repayment of previously withheld fair share payments. Oregon City Federation of Teachers v. OCEA, 36 Or App 27, 584 P2d 303 (1978)
Collective bargaining agreement requiring payments of only those nonunion members who had been union members during term of agreement but had dropped out of union was not fair share agreement within meaning of this section. Stines v. OSEA, 287 Or 643, 601 P2d 799 (1979)
Although teachers’ summer vacation was mandatory bargaining subject, scheduling summer vacation and teachers’ “workdays” were permissive bargaining subjects. Eugene Education Assn. v. Eugene School Dist., 46 Or App 733, 613 P2d 79 (1980)
Determination of whether certain aspects of public schoolteacher evaluations were “conditions of employment” and therefore employment relations subject to mandatory collective bargaining was properly made by Employment Relations Board in exercise of interpretive rather than legislative authority as statute embodies complete expression of legislative policy not subject to refinement by ERB. Springfield Educ. Assn. v. Springfield School Dist., 290 Or 217, 621 P2d 547 (1980)
Firefighters’ safety proposal was mandatory subject for bargaining where ERB found safety is of “like character” to statutory examples of employment relations and firefighters proved that preponderant purpose of specific language of proposal was to protect employes. International Assoc. of Firefighters, Local 314 v. City of Salem, 68 Or App 793, 684 P2d 605 (1984), Sup Ct review denied
Employment Relations Board has authority to determine propriety of payment-in-lieu-of-dues amount agreed upon by public employer and exclusive representative of employees. Carlson v. AFSCME, 73 Or App 755, 700 P2d 260 (1985), Sup Ct review denied
Prohibition in ORS 260.432 against requiring public employee to support political cause does not supersede right of exclusive representative of employees to collect payment-in-lieu-of-dues to support political position affecting rights of represented employees. Carlson v. AFSCME, 73 Or App 755, 700 P2d 260 (1985), Sup Ct review denied
When “fair share” provision exempts from its operation certain state agencies, but is otherwise in all respects fair share agreement, it is invalid under this section because it does not require contribution by all nonunion members of bargaining unit. Stevens v. OPEU, 82 Or App 264, 728 P2d 97 (1986), Sup Ct review denied
Because legislature explicitly included “matters concerning...vacations” within definition of “employment relations” in this section, Employment Relations Board erred in interpreting “employment relations” to include only those vacation proposals that affect “employment conditions” to a greater extent than “management rights.” Portland Fire Fighters Assoc. v. City of Portland, 305 Or 275, 751 P2d 770 (1988)
City of Salem’s reserve police officer program involved “matters concerning direct or indirect monetary benefits” within meaning of “employment relations.” Salem Police Employees Union v. City of Salem, 308 Or 383, 781 P2d 335 (1989)
Collective bargaining agreement which required continuing payments to all employees except for those working less than 15 hours per week was “fair share” agreement. Bates v. Portland Federation of Teachers, 106 Or App 221, 807 P2d 306 (1991)
Where union collected “fair share” payments from nonunion public employees without complying with safeguards instituted to protect employees’ rights of free speech and association, restitution was appropriate remedy. Elvin v. OPEU, 313 Or 165, 832 P2d 36 (1992)
Employment Relations Board misinterpreted “employment relations” by treating workload as if workload were same as five enumerated items in this section. Tualatin Valley Bargaining v. Tigard School Dist., 314 Or 274, 840 P2d 657 (1992)
Whether “other conditions of employment” includes proposal depends on specific facts of each case. Tualatin Valley Bargaining v. Tigard School Dist., 314 Or 274, 840 P2d 657 (1992)
Determination whether subject has greater impact on management’s prerogative than on wages, hours or other terms is irrelevant for matter specifically listed as being subject of “employment relations.” Eugene Police Employees’ Association v. City of Eugene, 157 Or App 341, 972 P2d 1191 (1998), Sup Ct review denied
“Academically licensed” refers to positions requiring academic training and involving provision of direct professional service to students, whether or not requiring formal licensing. Linn-Benton-Lincoln Education Association v. Linn-Benton-Lincoln ESD, 163 Or App 558, 989 P2d 25 (1999)
Where change in minimum qualifications necessary for position has impact on direct or indirect monetary benefits, impact of change in minimum qualifications is subject to mandatory bargaining. Beaverton Police Association v. City of Beaverton, 194 Or App 531, 95 P3d 1160 (2004)
Where proposal for required employee training courses includes some courses that involve safety issues but not all courses involve safety issues, proposal does not involve a “safety issue” under subsection (7) of this section because it is not reasonably understood, on its face, to directly address a matter related to on-the-job safety of employees. Multnomah County Corrections Deputy Association v. Multnomah County, 257 Or App 713, 308 P3d 230 (2013)
“Reasonable belief” standard is proper standard for determining which individuals constitute “public employer representative” under this section. Therefore, when employees of public employer reasonably believe that individual acted on behalf of public employer in committing unfair labor practice, that individual constitutes “public employer representative” under this section such that employer may be held liable for individual’s conduct under ORS 243.672. AFSCME Council 75 v. City of Lebanon, 360 Or 809, 388 P3d 1028 (2017)
Department chairs may organize under Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act because they are not in charge of departments and their primary focus is academic, not administrative; chairs are not in “head or equivalent position,” as used in this section. Oregon Tech AAUP v. Oregon Institute of Technology, 314 Or App 595, 500 P3 55 (2021), Sup Ct review denied
Employment Relations Board’s conclusion that employer had duty to bargain when union requested midterm bargaining over mandatory subject not specifically covered by parties’ agreement, even without unilateral change by employer, was within range of discretion allowed by policy underlying Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Multnomah County v. Mult. County Corrections Deputy Assn., 317 Or App 89, 505 P3d 1037 (2022)
Attorney General Opinions
Right of a nonlawyer union business agent to represent a member before the Public Employe Relations Board, (1972) Vol 35, p 1088; American Association of University Professors as a labor organization, (1972) Vol 35, p 1105; seniority as a related economic issue, (1972) Vol 35, p 1134; Retirement benefit credit for unused sick leave, request by school district, (1973) Vol 36, p 665; uniform collective bargaining for state employes in same class of position, (1978) Vol 38, p 1694; permissible payment which may be required from nonmembers with respect to Fair Share Agreements, (1978) Vol 38, p 1855
Law Review Citations
28 WLR 259 (1992); 32 WLR 69, 707 (1996)