ORS 131.605
Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625

As used in ORS 131.605 (Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625) to 131.625 (Frisk of stopped persons), unless the context requires otherwise:


“Crime” has the meaning provided for that term in ORS 161.515 (“Crime” described).


“Dangerous weapon,” “deadly weapon” and “person” have the meanings given those terms in ORS 161.015 (General definitions).


“Frisk” is an external patting of a person’s outer clothing.


“Is about to commit” means unusual conduct that leads a peace officer reasonably to conclude in light of the officer’s training and experience that criminal activity may be afoot.


“Peace officer” has the meaning given that term in ORS 133.005 (Definitions for ORS 133.005 to 133.400 and 133.410 to 133.450).


“Reasonably suspects” means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts as authorized in ORS 131.605 (Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625) to 131.625 (Frisk of stopped persons).


A “stop” is a temporary restraint of a person’s liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place. [1973 c.836 §30; 1997 c.866 §2; 2011 c.506 §6; 2011 c.644 §12]

Source: Section 131.605 — Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625, https://www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/bills_laws/ors/ors131.­html.

Notes of Decisions

Reasonable suspicion

Stop of only vehicle observed traveling in general area where crime had just occurred was reasonable. State v. Jones, 23 Or App 706, 543 P2d 1103 (1975); State v. Teal, 94 Or App 381, 765 P2d 827 (1988); State v. Nguyen, 176 Or App 258, 31 P3d 489 (2001)

Where anonymous informant reported, inter alia, that operator of yellow Ford pickup had nearly forced him off road, had appeared very intoxicated and had pulled rifle on him during dispute, officer had requisite “reasonable suspicion” to detain driver; overruling State v. Caproni, 19 Or App 789, 529 P2d 974 (1974). State v. Lindstrom, 37 Or App 513, 588 P2d 44 (1978)

When police officer sighted car similar to one listed on “hot sheet,” but did not know license number of stolen vehicle, sufficient basis for stop existed. State v. Worthington, 39 Or App 775, 593 P2d 1241 (1979), Sup Ct review denied

Unusually slow speed of vehicle that only partially matched description of suspect vehicle did not provide reasonable suspicion justifying stop. State v. Ponce, 43 Or App 665, 603 P2d 1243 (1979)

Where police officer, parked in front of police station, heard sound of breaking glass at about 3 a.m. and soon after saw defendant’s car come down alley from police parking lot, circumstances were sufficient to arouse suspicion that crime had been committed. State v. Schedler, 47 Or App 181, 614 P2d 591 (1980), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officer knew that robbery had been committed five hours before, defendant’s car matched description of car involved in robbery and defendant sought to evade officer after officer began to trail him, reasonable suspicion existed to stop defendant. State v. Armstrong, 52 Or App 161, 628 P2d 1206 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Where police report mentioned two black men fleeing scene of robbery and where officer’s intuition led him to believe vehicle and third party were also likely involved, suspects’ direction of travel together with fact that they were only observed black men in predominately white neighborhood gave rise to reasonable suspicion to stop suspects pursuant to ORS 131.615. State v. Ott, 54 Or App 309, 634 P2d 825 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Where telephone call claiming caller planned to detonate bomb was traced to telephone booth, defendant’s conduct in nearby booth was peculiar and defendant took “hard look” at area known to be location of bomb, there was reasonable suspicion justifying stop of defendant. State v. Miller, 54 Or App 323, 634 P2d 1361 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Where crime being investigated had not occurred recently, general resemblance to suspects did not give officers basis for stopping defendants. State v. Hageman, 59 Or App 96, 650 P2d 175 (1982)

Where further investigation of package was limited in intensity and scope, temporary detention of package required only reasonable suspicion that package contained contraband. State v. Kosta, 75 Or App 713, 708 P2d 365 (1985), aff’d on other grounds, 304 Or 549, 748 P2d 72 (1987)

Stop of defendant was not based on reasonable suspicion where store was robbed by black man who fled on foot and three minutes later, on way to robbery scene in predominantly white area, officer met car occupied by two black men traveling in opposite direction and where as car approached, passenger turned head away from officer. State v. Hunter, 86 Or App 697, 740 P2d 234 (1987)

In absence of any evidence of criminal activity, furtive gestures provide no basis for stop. State v. Butkovich, 87 Or App 587, 743 P2d 752 (1987), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Moya, 97 Or App 375, 775 P2d 927 (1989)

Car’s “jerking back and forth” on highway supported reasonable suspicion that driver was influenced by intoxicants. State v. Wright, 94 Or App 468, 765 P2d 1251 (1988), Sup Ct review denied

Officers lacked “reasonable suspicion” at time of stop where defendant was merely walking down street at night in “high crime” neighborhood carrying bag. State v. Anfield, 95 Or App 568, 770 P2d 919 (1989)

Police had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed crime of entering vehicle without consent of owner where security officers told police defendant had been working under dashboard of car with flashlight and there had been number of car prowls in that area, including one that day. State v. Codr, 99 Or App 417, 782 P2d 442 (1989)

Citizen reporting crime is not required to be ambivalent about arrest of suspect in order for officer receiving report to have reasonable suspicion. State v. Shumway, 124 Or App 131, 861 P2d 384 (1993), Sup Ct review denied

Whether officer had subjective reasonable suspicion may be inferred from conduct without direct testimony by officer regarding suspicion. State v. Belt, 137 Or App 440, 905 P2d 862 (1995), aff’d 325 Or 6, 932 P2d 1177 (1997); State v. Bickford, 157 Or App 386, 970 P2d 234 (1998), Sup Ct review denied

When encounter is stop

Fact that police officer approached defendant’s vehicle in public parking lot and spoke to defendant did not constitute “stop,” and thus officer’s view into defendant’s car was from “lawful vantage” at time he observed marijuana in plain view on defendant’s floorboard. State v. Porter, 31 Or App 229, 570 P2d 111 (1977), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Porter, 38 Or App 169, 589 P2d 1156 (1979)

Where police officer identified himself to defendant, showed his badge, and asked to speak with defendant, there was temporary restraint on defendant’s liberty constituting a “stop.” State v. Wilson, 31 Or App 783, 571 P2d 554 (1977), Sup Ct review denied

Where officer prevented defendant and companion from leaving tavern and “asked” defendant to put ID on table, this constituted “stop” within meaning of this section. State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 585 P2d 681 (1978)

Where police officer parked patrol car in such position that defendant would have to maneuver around patrol car in order to depart, action of officer in so parking car did not restrain defendant’s liberty. State v. Porter, 38 Or App 169, 589 P2d 1156 (1979)

Where off-duty state trooper stopped and questioned driver who was driving erratically, and where he was acting in capacity of citizen, there was no stop within meaning of this section. State v. Chaput, 43 Or App 831, 604 P2d 435 (1979)

Where two uniformed police officers approached defendant from their marked patrol car, inquired as to his reason for being in area, asked for identification, and told him he resembled burglary suspect, defendant’s encounter with police constituted stop. State v. Canape, 46 Or App 453, 611 P2d 1190 (1980)

Where officer following defendant’s vehicle did not have overhead lights on, defendant voluntarily pulled over, officer pulled up next to defendant and walked to his car in response to conversation initiated by defendant, encounter was not stop. State v. Spenst, 62 Or App 755, 662 P2d 5 (1983), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officer had decided to restrain defendant’s liberty temporarily, not merely to ask him some preliminary questions with defendant free to leave if he chose, encounter that followed was stop, even though officer’s intent had not been communicated to defendant. State v. Goaid, 68 Or App 904, 683 P2d 129 (1984)

Encounter was not “stop” where defendant, at his van in parking lot, agreed to talk to officers, who made no effort to restrain his freedom of movement and told him, when asked, that he was free to leave. State v. North, 72 Or App 1, 694 P2d 990 (1985), Sup Ct review denied

Turning on patrol car overhead lights does not necessarily transform encounter into stop. State v. Dubois, 75 Or App 394, 706 P2d 588 (1985)

Distinguishing feature of “stop” is that person’s liberty is restrained by either physical force or show of authority. State v. Hasan, 93 Or App 142, 760 P2d 1377 (1988)

Where officer followed defendant into parking lot and made contact as defendant was getting out of car, officer did not restrain defendant’s liberty by approaching defendant’s car and speaking to him. State v. Eisenbarth, 93 Or App 384, 762 P2d 343 (1988)

Officer’s request that defendant come out from behind bush and walk 15 feet to where officer was standing was show of authority that converted conversation into “stop.” State v. Johnson, 105 Or App 587, 805 P2d 747 (1991)

Officer’s conduct did not constitute “stop” where officer approached defendant and asked defendant for hunting and driver licenses and defendant admitted that driver license was suspended. State v. Lunow, 114 Or App 239, 835 P2d 129 (1992), Sup Ct review denied

Officer did not conduct stop when defendant pulled vehicle into his driveway, officer pulled in behind defendant but did not use car’s overhead lights or restrain defendant either by force or show of authority, and defendant got out of car, approached officer and initiated conversation. State v. Norman, 114 Or App 395, 835 P2d 146 (1992)

Where defendant pulled onto shoulder of highway at place posted for emergency parking and police officer pulled in behind defendant to offer assistance, contact was not stop until officer acquired reason to inquire into defendant’s sobriety. State v. Miller, 120 Or App 349, 852 P2d 895 (1993)

Officer’s approach of parked vehicle and request for identification did not constitute stop. State v. Gilmore, 123 Or App 594, 860 P2d 882 (1993), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Warner, 136 Or App 475, 901 P2d 940 (1995)

Where school official’s action extends beyond restraint and investigation justified by compulsory attendance laws, stop requiring reasonable suspicion occurs. State ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. Rohlffs, 147 Or App 565, 938 P2d 768 (1997)

Encounter becomes stop when restraint or interference with citizen freedom of movement is significantly out of ordinary. State v. Blair/Vanis, 171 Or App 162, 14 P3d 660 (2000), Sup Ct review denied

Police officer’s physical restraint of person does not convert stop into arrest. State v. McKinney, 174 Or App 47, 23 P3d 386 (2001), Sup Ct review denied

Where suspect is not handcuffed, restraint on suspect’s liberty consistent with officer’s need to control scene during investigation does not convert stop into arrest. State v. Werowinski, 179 Or App 522, 40 P3d 545 (2002), Sup Ct review denied

Where person displays identification to officer, but officer is not in possession of identification, no stop has occurred. State v. Cohan, 227 Or App 63, 204 P3d 816 (2009), Sup Ct review denied


Where officers were told defendant carried gun, but not what type of gun, stop and frisk for concealed weapon was reasonable. State v. Bowcutt, 62 Or App 591, 661 P2d 565 (1983), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officer would have discovered box even if he had not lifted defendant’s shirt, method of search used was not overly intrusive. State v. Bechtold, 99 Or App 593, 783 P2d 1008 (1989), Sup Ct review denied

General definitions
“Victim” defined
Application to prior and subsequent actions
Parties in criminal action
When departures, errors or mistakes in pleadings or proceedings are material
When law enforcement officer may communicate with person represented by counsel
Appearances by simultaneous electronic transmission
Timeliness of criminal actions
Time limitations
When prosecution commenced
When time starts to run
Tolling of statute
Definition for ORS 131.205 to 131.235
Criminal homicide
Place of trial
Special provisions
Place of trial
Change of venue
Motion for change of venue
Change of venue for prejudice
Change of venue in other cases
Notification on change of venue
When change of venue is complete
Expenses of change
Attendance of defendant at new place of trial
Conveyance of defendant in custody after change of venue
Definitions for ORS 131.505 to 131.525
Previous prosecution
Previous prosecution
Proceedings not constituting acquittal
Definitions for ORS 131.550 to 131.600
Legislative findings
Right, title and interest in forfeited property vests in seizing agency
Property subject to forfeiture
Seizure of property subject to forfeiture
Status of seized property
Motor vehicle with hidden compartment
Recorded notice of intent to forfeit real property
Notice of seizure for forfeiture
Petition for expedited hearing
Order restoring custody of property after expedited hearing
Affidavit in response to notice of seizure for forfeiture
Prosecution of criminal forfeiture
Extent of judgment
Judgment of forfeiture
Equitable distribution of property or proceeds
Disposition and distribution of forfeited property when seizing agency not the state
Disposition and distribution of forfeited property when seizing agency is the state
Record keeping and reporting requirements
Prohibited conduct for purposes of instrumentalities of crime
Disposition of forfeited cigarettes
Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625
Stopping of persons
Frisk of stopped persons
Detention and interrogation of persons suspected of theft committed in a store or unlawful operation of audiovisual device in a motion picture theater
Prevention by public officers
Dispersal of unlawful assemblages
Authority of Governor to enter into agreements with other states for crime prevention purposes
Definitions for ORS 131.705 to 131.735
Proclamation of emergency period by Governor
Exclusion from public property
Review of exclusion order
Authority to employ special agents
Presentment of facts to circuit court
Request that judge of another district conduct hearing
Appointment of special officers on finding that laws are not enforced
Qualifying of special officers
Compensation of special officers
Effect of appointment of special officers on salary of regular officers
Appointment of railroad police officers
Offer of reward
Entitlement to reward
Offer of reward for information on commission of criminal offense
Procedure for payment
Authority to order repayment of reward as part of sentence
Liability for medical expenses for person restrained, detained or taken into custody
Legislative findings
Law Enforcement Contacts Policy and Data Review Committee
Funding contributions
Moneys received
Policies and procedures prohibiting profiling
Complaints alleging profiling
Collection of officer-initiated stop data
Analysis of stop data to identify profiling
Training for law enforcement agencies
Green check means up to date. Up to date