ORS 131.615
Stopping of persons


A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry.


The detention and inquiry shall be conducted in the vicinity of the stop and for no longer than a reasonable time.


The inquiry shall be considered reasonable if it is limited to:


The immediate circumstances that aroused the officer’s suspicion;


Other circumstances arising during the course of the detention and inquiry that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and


Ensuring the safety of the officer, the person stopped or other persons present, including an inquiry regarding the presence of weapons.


The inquiry may include a request for consent to search in relation to the circumstances specified in subsection (3) of this section or to search for items of evidence otherwise subject to search or seizure under ORS 133.535 (Permissible objects of search and seizure).


A peace officer making a stop may use the degree of force reasonably necessary to make the stop and ensure the safety of the peace officer, the person stopped or other persons who are present. [1973 c.836 §31; 1997 c.866 §1]

Source: Section 131.615 — Stopping of persons, https://www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/bills_laws/ors/ors131.­html.

Notes of Decisions

In general

Law enforcement officers have justification for temporarily seizing or stopping person to conduct investigation if officer’s activities are reasonably related to investigation and reasonably necessary to effectuate investigation. State v. Watson, 353 Or 768, 305 P3d 94 (2013)

Reasonable suspicion

In general

Where officer knows crime has been committed, question becomes whether reasonable possibility exists that person observed is connected to that crime, so factors that would otherwise be of marginal significance may justify stop. State v. Denny, 27 Or App 455, 566 P2d 719 (1976); State v. Ott, 54 Or App 309, 634 P2d 825 (1981), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Richards, 57 Or App 140, 643 P2d 1348 (1982)

A stop must be justified by facts suggesting criminal activity which can be objectively evaluated apart from police instinct. State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977); State v. Carter/Dawson, 34 Or App 21, 578 P2d 790 (1978), aff’d 287 Or 479, 600 P2d 873 (1979); State v. Hoggans, 35 Or App 669, 582 P2d 466 (1978); State v. Scott, 59 Or App 220, 650 P2d 985 (1982); State v. Lichty, 313 Or 579, 835 P2d 904 (1992)

Officer’s subjective suspicion concerning occupants of automobile does not invalidate stop based on objectively identifiable traffic violation. State v. Carter/Dawson, 34 Or App 21, 578 P2d 790 (1978), aff’d 287 Or 479, 600 P2d 873 (1979); State v. Tucker, 286 Or 485, 595 P2d 1364 (1979); State v. Zimmerlee, 45 Or App 107, 607 P2d 982 (1980), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Kolendar, 100 Or App 319, 786 P2d 199 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officer observed vehicle weaving within its lane and had been informed through radio check that registered owner was wanted person, fact that radio report was mistaken did not make stop invalid. State v. Perry, 39 Or App 37, 591 P2d 379 (1979)

Objective basis for stop is determined by facts actually relied on by officer, not facts officer could have chosen to rely on. State v. Henry, 55 Or App 503, 638 P2d 1167 (1982), Sup Ct review denied

This section requires only that officer reasonably suspect person has committed crime before making stop, not probable cause. State v. North, 72 Or App 1, 694 P2d 990 (1985), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Lichty, 313 Or 579, 835 P2d 904 (1992)

Police officer may stop vehicle he sees being driven on public roadway if he has probable cause to believe that registered owner of vehicle has suspended driver license, unless driver’s observable physical characteristics put officer on notice that driver is not vehicle’s owner. State v. Wright, 85 Or App 545, 737 P2d 646 (1987); State v. Panko, 101 Or App 6, 788 P2d 1026 (1990)

Stop made solely pursuant to general community caretaking function does not support use of resulting evidence in criminal trial. State v. Lumsden, 93 Or App 604, 763 P2d 194 (1988)

Where male member of group had offered to sell drugs to third party while separated from group, officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe female defendant had committed crime simply because she was part of group. State v. Manss, 99 Or App 498, 783 P2d 24 (1989)

Knowledge of several police officers may collectively establish reasonable suspicion that defendant has committed crime. State v. Walsh, 103 Or App 517, 798 P2d 262 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Officer’s conclusional statement that defendant was visibly intoxicated was sufficient communication of articulable facts supporting stop. State v. Wright, 112 Or App 567, 829 P2d 93 (1992), aff’d 315 Or 124, 843 P2d 436 (1992)

Traffic infraction is not required for officer to have reasonable suspicion that driver is impaired. State v. Sulser, 127 Or App 45, 871 P2d 126 (1994)

Whether officer had subjective reasonable suspicion may be inferred from conduct without direct testimony by officer regarding suspicion. State v. Belt, 137 Or App 440, 905 P2d 862 (1995), aff’d 325 Or 6, 932 P2d 1177 (1997); State v. Bickford, 157 Or App 386, 970 P2d 234 (1998), Sup Ct review denied

Level of suspicion for making stop and level of suspicion required for expanding scope of investigation during course of traffic stop are identical. State v. Aguilar, 139 Or App 175, 912 P2d 379 (1996), Sup Ct review denied

Fact that there are possible legal explanations for observed behavior does not negate reasonable suspicion of criminality. State v. Crites, 151 Or App 313, 948 P2d 757 (1997), Sup Ct review denied

Whether suspicion is objectively reasonable is determined based upon totality of circumstances. State v. Hammonds/Deshler, 155 Or App 622, 964 P2d 1094 (1998)

Questioning during lawful stop on matter unrelated to basis for stop does not require independent reasonable suspicion regarding unrelated matter. State v. Hendon, 222 Or App 97, 194 P3d 149 (2008)

Based on tips or citizen reports

Informant’s tip, parts of which were extrinsically corroborated, was sufficient to establish reasonable basis for suspicion that crime had been committed, so as to permit lawful stop. State v. Wilson, 31 Or App 783, 571 P2d 554 (1977), Sup Ct review denied

Where anonymous informant reported, inter alia, that operator of yellow Ford pickup had nearly forced him off road, had appeared very intoxicated and had pulled rifle on him during dispute, officer had requisite “reasonable suspicion” to detain driver; overruling State v. Caproni, 19 Or App 789, 529 P2d 974 (1974). State v. Lindstrom, 37 Or App 513, 588 P2d 44 (1978)

Where fish and game officer received information one week before stop that there had been illegal deer kills in area sometime in past and this information did not relate to specific persons or vehicles stopped, stop was improper under this section. State v. Odam, 40 Or App 551, 595 P2d 1277 (1979), aff’d 290 Or 160, 619 P2d 647 (1980)

Anonymous tip that defendant was engaged in illegal fishing activities each night gave police reasonable suspicion to stop his truck. State v. Dickenson, 43 Or App 1023, 607 P2d 754 (1979)

Anonymous tip possessing no indicia of reliability was not sufficient basis for police officer’s stop of defendant’s car on suspicion defendant had committed crime. State v. Black, 80 Or App 12, 721 P2d 842 (1986); State v. Tibbet, 96 Or App 116, 771 P2d 654 (1989)

Tip from named citizen informant has sufficient indicia of reliability to support stop. State v. Faulkner, 89 Or App 120, 747 P2d 1011 (1987); State v. Lichty, 313 Or 579, 835 P2d 904 (1992)

Where children told officer they thought van was following them, officer’s stop of van was illegal as information obtained from children was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion defendant had committed crime. State v. Hyder, 90 Or App 317, 752 P2d 327 (1988)

Whether unidentified informant’s tip gives rise to reasonable suspicion that someone has committed crime depends upon particular circumstances surrounding informant’s contact with police. State v. Vanness, 99 Or App 120, 781 P2d 391 (1989)

Named citizen informant’s conclusional statement that bag of cocaine fell out of wallet was shorthand relation of objective observations upon which officer could rely to form reasonable suspicion substance was cocaine. State v. Lichty, 313 Or 579, 835 P2d 904 (1992)

Based on presence in area

Stop of only vehicle observed traveling in general area where crime had just occurred was reasonable. State v. Jones, 23 Or App 706, 543 P2d 1103 (1975); State v. Teal, 94 Or App 381, 765 P2d 827 (1988); State v. Nguyen, 176 Or App 258, 31 P3d 489 (2001)

Notwithstanding that defendant was walking in area of high vice activity and talking to known prostitute, stop of defendant for suspicion of attempted prostitution was not reasonable. State v. Brown, 31 Or App 501, 570 P2d 1001 (1977)

Where officer received police dispatch that burglary had been committed in last half hour within approximately three miles of place officer observed defendant’s car, and car was driven evasively, there was justification for officer to reasonably suspect criminal activity. State v. Bartosz, 34 Or App 123, 578 P2d 426 (1978)

Where crime had just occurred in low traffic area at late hour, stop of nearby vehicle partially matching and partially contradicting description of suspect vehicle was justified. State v. Ragsdale, 34 Or App 549, 579 P2d 286 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officer was guarding mayor’s home in response to threats against mayor, defendant’s visit to neighboring house did not provide grounds to stop and frisk. State v. Gaffney, 36 Or App 105, 583 P2d 582 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

Where officer heard radio report that burglary was in process at certain address, was within eighth to quarter of mile from scene, and stopped vehicle coming from general direction of burglary, reasonable suspicion standard was not met. State v. Fitzgerald, 36 Or App 473, 584 P2d 785 (1978)

Where defendant was stopped in general residential area of recent series of burglaries and closely fit description of burglary suspect, officers reasonably suspected the defendant had committed burglaries. State v. Canape, 46 Or App 453, 611 P2d 1190 (1980)

Where defendant parked in parking lot of automobile supply business and approached front door of building at one a.m. on Saturday morning, officer had reasonable suspicion that crime was being committed. State v. Anderson, 46 Or App 501, 612 P2d 309 (1980), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officer, parked in front of police station, heard sound of breaking glass at about 3 a.m. and soon after saw defendant’s car come down alley from police parking lot, circumstances were sufficient to arouse suspicion that crime had been committed and stop was proper. State v. Schedler, 47 Or App 181, 614 P2d 591 (1980), Sup Ct review denied

Where telephone call claiming caller planned to detonate bomb was traced to telephone booth, defendant’s conduct in nearby booth was peculiar and defendant took “hard look” at area known to be location of bomb, there was reasonable suspicion justifying stop of defendant. State v. Miller, 54 Or App 323, 634 P2d 1361 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant and companion were sitting in parked truck at 3:45 a.m. in deserted parking lot and no other evidence of robbery or burglary existed, though facts made it reasonable for police officers to inquire further, they did not create reasonable suspicion that defendant or companion had committed crime. State v. Messer, 71 Or App 506, 692 P2d 713 (1984)

That officer was aware from prior experience and training that downtown bus mall had reputation for weapons-carrying narcotics offenders did not, in absence of additional facts related to person in question, provide reasonable suspicion to believe that person stopped for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana was armed and dangerous. State v. Baldwin, 76 Or App 723, 712 P2d 120 (1985), Sup Ct review denied

Stop of defendant was not based on reasonable suspicion where store was robbed by black man who fled on foot and three minutes later, on way to robbery scene in predominantly white area, officer met car occupied by two black men traveling in opposite direction and where as car approached, passenger turned head away from officer. State v. Hunter, 86 Or App 697, 740 P2d 234 (1987)

Officer did not have reasonable suspicion for stop, where defendant’s vehicle was parked in unlit driveway next to drive up window of closed restaurant. State v. Butkovich, 87 Or App 587, 743 P2d 752 (1987), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Greer, 93 Or App 409, 763 P2d 158 (1988)

Insufficient basis for stop existed where defendant was parked in area containing both legitimate businesses and hotel notorious for drug trafficking, had been seen in area before and was examining something in her hands which she concealed upon confrontation by police. State v. Moya, 97 Or App 375, 775 P2d 927 (1989)

Stop was supported by reasonable suspicion where defendant, who was stranger, was present in driveway of residence when usual residents appeared to be away, front door was standing open even though it was rainy day in March and defendant’s vehicle was same make as others used in similar burglaries. State v. LaFrienier, 97 Or App 672, 776 P2d 1325 (1989)

Police had reasonable suspicion defendant was cultivating marijuana because he was only person seen in vicinity of marijuana patch during two-day surveillance, was there for approximately two hours and carried tool that looked like clippers, so stop was lawful. State v. Brown, 100 Or App 204, 785 P2d 790 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Based on behavior, description or other

Evidence that, upon seeing marked police car behind him, driver pulled off and exchanged places with passenger, and when officer again followed car, former driver kept glancing back, was sufficient “reasonable suspicion” for stop. State v. Albertsen, 37 Or App 679, 590 P2d 615 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

Where officers heard CB transmissions allegedly concerning illegal fishing between defendant and others and observed furtive conduct there was sufficient grounds for stop under this section. State v. Pratt, 41 Or App 149, 597 P2d 842 (1979), Sup Ct review denied

Unusually slow speed of vehicle that only partially matched description of suspect vehicle did not provide reasonable suspicion justifying stop. State v. Ponce, 43 Or App 665, 603 P2d 1243 (1979)

Where police officer knew that robbery had been committed five hours before, defendant’s car matched description of car involved in robbery and defendant sought to evade officer after officer began to trail him, reasonable suspicion existed to stop defendant. State v. Armstrong, 52 Or App 161, 628 P2d 1206 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Officer’s knowledge that serious crime, robbery at credit union, had been committed, coupled with circumstances he had observed, made it reasonable to suspect that people in automobile were connected with crime and investigatory stop was therefore proper. State v. Ott, 54 Or App 309, 634 P2d 825 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

That defendant matched description of burglar fairly closely raised reasonable suspicion justifying stop, and additional fact defendant turned and ran after voluntarily agreeing to accompany officer to burglary scene gave officer probable cause to arrest. State v. Battle, 58 Or App 224, 648 P2d 411 (1982)

Where crime being investigated had not occurred recently, general resemblance to suspects did not give officers basis for stopping defendants. State v. Hageman, 59 Or App 96, 650 P2d 175 (1982)

Police officer had reasonable, articulable basis for stop where: 1) he had observed exchange between defendant and another person; 2) his training and experience told him that what he saw was “hand-to-hand sale” of narcotics; and 3) defendant and other person were outside restaurant that had reputation as hangout for drug dealers and users. State v. Norman, 66 Or App 443, 674 P2d 626 (1984), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officers saw two cars parked next to each other in somewhat secluded area and saw defendant walk from one car to the other carrying brown paper bag with something in it, they did not have objective reasonable suspicion that would justify stopping defendant. State v. King, 67 Or App 749, 680 P2d 10 (1984)

Facts that defendant was in “ratty” car in upper-income neighborhood and that defendant apparently had trouble keeping pipe lit did not give officer reason to believe defendant had committed or was committing offense of either burglary or possession of controlled substance. State v. Chambers, 69 Or App 681, 687 P2d 805 (1984)

Where defendant, driving car matching description of one present at time of burglary several days before, was near scene where burglary had occurred, police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. State v. Martin, 71 Or App 1, 691 P2d 154 (1984)

Where defendant was driving 20-25 m.p.h. in 55 m.p.h. zone and followed “drive/stop/proceed” pattern, and where police officer knew from training and experience that those two circumstances often indicate that a person is driving while intoxicated, officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. State v. Ratliff, 82 Or App 479, 728 P2d 896 (1986), aff’d on other grounds, 304 Or 254, 744 P2d 247 (1987)

Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant driver because he had flushed face and watery eyes and apparently did not react to pedestrian who stepped close to defendant’s moving vehicle. State v. Kimmel, 82 Or App 486, 728 P2d 894 (1986)

Police officer was justified in stopping vehicle where immediately before stop, he observed vehicle parked unattended in area that had recently experienced criminal activity and car’s description matched car suspected of being used in prior robbery. State v. Wright, 85 Or App 545, 737 P2d 646 (1987)

Police officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed crime of driving under influence of intoxicants given defendant’s bloodshot eyes, fatigue, his being alone in car parked on shoulder of road with engine running and lights on and with faint odor of alcohol on his breath and, therefore, officer’s stop of defendant was justified. State v. Guerricagoitia, 89 Or App 163, 747 P2d 386 (1987), Sup Ct review denied

Defendant’s nervousness and fact he seemed to be sitting at odd angle did not justify reasonable belief that he had committed crime or was armed and presently dangerous. State v. Houghton, 91 Or App 71, 754 P2d 13 (1988)

Where officer’s suspicion was not based only on defendant’s looking out of place in neighborhood, but also on knowledge of previous burglaries in area and on information received regarding defendant’s conduct, suspicion was reasonable. State v. Wolfe, 93 Or App 401, 763 P2d 154 (1988), Sup Ct review denied

Police had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed crime of entering vehicle without consent of owner where security officers told police defendant had been working under dashboard of car with flashlight and there had been number of car prowls in that area, including one that day. State v. Codr, 99 Or App 417, 782 P2d 442 (1989)

Where officers knew vehicle used in robbery was white van with California plates and van was proceeding along possible escape route, there was reasonable suspicion to support stop. State v. Umphrey, 100 Or App 433, 786 P2d 1279 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Where officer observed defendant experiencing difficulty walking, trying to avoid being seen driving on two occasions and then driving at inappropriately slow speed, reasonable suspicion existed that defendant was driving under influence of intoxicants. State v. Nelson, 109 Or App 97, 817 P2d 1344 (1991), Sup Ct review denied

Where officer observed known prostitute entering defendant’s car and woman appeared to be engaging in sexual act with defendant, officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated city ordinance and had authority to stop defendant’s car to make inquiry. City of Portland v. Spangler, 109 Or App 370, 819 P2d 754 (1991)

Officer’s reasonable suspicion that defendant had supplied false name was not sufficient basis for stop. State v. Olson, 116 Or App 525, 842 P2d 424 (1992)

Statement by automobile occupants overheard and reported by citizen, location of automobile and behavior of occupants when police drove past gave reasonable cause for stop. State v. Jacobus, 318 Or 234, 864 P2d 861 (1993)

Under collective knowledge doctrine, officer may reasonably rely on fellow officer’s direction to stop vehicle for traffic violation when fellow officer has probable cause to believe traffic violation has occured. State v. Soldahl, 331 Or 420, 15 P3d 564 (2000)

Evidence of recent drug use by person who is not currently intoxicated, without more, is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion that person presently possesses drugs. State v. Holcomb, 202 Or App 73, 121 P3d 13 (2005), modified 203 Or App 35, 125 P3d 22 (2005)

Detention and inquiry


Where, two hours after crime, uniformed officers observed defendant, who matched crime suspect’s description, in area two miles from crime, officers’ stop of defendant and inquiry as to his activities at time of crime were investigatory in nature, and did not constitute custodial interrogation which would require advising defendant of rights prior to making inquiry. State v. Mitchell, 35 Or App 809, 583 P2d 14 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

Where traffic citation could be issued and defendant gave inconsistent answers concerning identity, transporting defendant to police station to establish identity did not transform stop into arrest. State v. Tucker, 286 Or 485, 595 P2d 1364 (1979)

This section does not prohibit game check point stops, as legislature did not intend to limit all stops for law enforcement purposes to those permitted by this section. State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or 845, 618 P2d 423 (1980)

This section is not the exclusive authority for stopping of persons by police officers. State v. Morris, 56 Or App 97, 641 P2d 77 (1982), Sup Ct review denied

Traffic infraction for which police officer could neither arrest or issue citation was not crime such as would justify detention and inquiry. State v. Painter, 296 Or 422, 676 P2d 309 (1984)

Two-hour detention of occupants of premises secured by police, based on information inadequate for search warrant, was unreasonable where police used time only to try to develop independent additional evidence to justify warrant. State v. Wise, 72 Or App 58, 695 P2d 68 (1985)

Where permission for search is obtained in absence of coercive factors, lack of basis for stop does not justify suppression of evidence. State v. Mercado, 105 Or App 582, 805 P2d 744 (1991), Sup Ct review denied

ORS 810.410 and this section provided authority for officer to open door of motor vehicle when officer observed motor vehicle oddly parked and discovered defendant slumped in driver’s seat with driver’s door slightly open and engine running. State v. Rhodes, 315 Or 191, 843 P2d 927 (1992)

Where two officers present did not draw weapons, did not use or threaten use of force, did not make promises or use other means of coercion, consent to search was voluntary. State v. Jacobus, 318 Or 234, 864 P2d 861 (1993)

Scope of

Detention and inquiry beyond time, place and subject-matter limits codified in this section, which are all components of “intrusiveness,” constitute invalid random intervention into liberty and privacy of a person. State v. Carter/Dawson, 34 Or App 21, 578 P2d 790 (1978), aff’d 287 Or 479, 600 P2d 873 (1979)

Where display of wad of money at tavern had been explained to officer’s satisfaction, continuation of stop was not proper. State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 585 P2d 681 (1978)

Search of car was impermissible intrusion in traffic stop after defendant had been frisked, was outside car, and had cooperated with officers. City of Portland v. Poindexter, 38 Or App 551, 590 P2d 781 (1979)

Where police officer had reasonable cause to stop vehicle, but ascertained that driver had no criminal record or outstanding process against him, further detention was unreasonable and evidence obtained after defendant’s proper identity was ascertained was properly suppressed. State v. Perry, 39 Or App 37, 591 P2d 379 (1979)

Permissible scope of questioning was exceeded where defendant was questioned about possible presence of weapons in vehicle when immediate circumstance that aroused officer’s suspicion was that vehicle was apparently parked in violation of municipal ordinance. State v. Kennedy, 68 Or App 529, 683 P2d 116 (1984)

Questioning concerning contents of bag was beyond scope of stop for suspicion of unrelated crime and unsupported by independent suspicion: consent to search based on admission of contents under above circumstances was not voluntary and evidence must be suppressed. State v. Smith, 73 Or App 287, 698 P2d 973 (1985)

Where warrant check does not take inordinately long time to complete, process does not exceed legitimate scope of stop. State v. Smith, 73 Or App 287, 698 P2d 973 (1985)

Where police checked vehicle passenger for valid driver license, continuation of stop of passenger after license check came back clear was unlawful. State v. Castrejon, 79 Or App 514, 719 P2d 916 (1986)

Circumstances that aroused officer’s suspicion must still exist when officer begins inquiry and, where police officer asked defendant for driver license when circumstances arousing suspicion (initial belief defendant was someone else recently cited for driving while suspended) no longer existed, motion to suppress evidence obtained was proper. State v. Harris, 88 Or App 433, 745 P2d 813 (1987), Sup Ct review denied

Where search occurred after and as result of arrest pursuant to outstanding warrant, even if stop preceding search was unlawful, arrest under warrant purged evidence of taint of illegality. State v. Carmickle, 97 Or App 269, 775 P2d 908 (1989), Sup Ct review denied

Where police officer requested to search defendant’s purse and found controlled substance, search did not exceed permissible scope of inquiry which was to investigate whether she was involved in drug activity. State v. Olney, 97 Or App 310, 775 P2d 914 (1989)

Police did not exceed permissible scope of inquiry by continuing inquiry after defendant produced documentation for car and explained defendant’s relationship to owner because documents did not connect defendant to car and police did not have to accept defendant’s explanation as true. State v. Codr, 99 Or App 417, 782 P2d 442 (1989)

Odor of alcohol on breath of driver stopped for traffic infraction is objective, observable fact that permits officer reasonably to suspect intoxication and to administer sobriety tests. State v. Kolendar, 100 Or App 319, 786 P2d 199 (1990), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Anderson, 108 Or App 294, 814 P2d 190 (1991)

Transport of suspect to scene of crime three blocks away violated requirement that detention and inquiry be conducted in vicinity of stop. Jasper v. Motor Vehicles Division, 130 Or App 603, 883 P2d 244 (1994)

Officer may make any inquiry reasonably related to general investigation of matter prompting stop. State v. Strawn, 154 Or App 460, 963 P2d 34 (1998)

Where police officer making stop for traffic violation has all information necessary to issue citation, delaying issuance of citation in order to engage in additional questioning without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity unlawfully extends duration of stop. State v. Rodgers, 219 Or App 366, 182 P3d 209 (2008), aff’d State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or 610, 227 P3d 695 (2010)

When encounter is stop

Where defendant voluntarily complied with officer’s request to speak with him and defendant gave his identification card and volunteered information that there was discrepancy between his current address and that on card, defendant was free to walk away if he chose and there was no “stop.” State v. Hanna, 52 Or App 503, 628 P2d 1246 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Where officer approached suspect in parking lot and called out for suspect to wait, contact did not constitute stop. State v. Tracy, 52 Or App 945, 630 P2d 370 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Stop was invalid where defendant had pulled over voluntarily and stopped, officers had no reasonable suspicion to believe she had committed a crime and officers had turned on emergency overhead lights. State v. Walp, 65 Or App 781, 672 P2d 374 (1983)

Turning on patrol car overhead lights does not necessarily transform encounter into stop. State v. Dubois, 75 Or App 394, 706 P2d 588 (1985), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant pedestrian was chased by police officer in car through pedestrian mall without any reasonable suspicion of having committed crime, illegal stop occurred and statements by defendant after additional officers had converged on scene was exploitation of illegal act. State v. Penney, 87 Or App 357, 742 P2d 660 (1987)

Although request for identification may not transform encounter into stop, where officer requested and retained defendant’s license, there was sufficient show of authority to lead reasonable person to believe there was no freedom to leave. State v. Starr, 91 Or App 267, 754 P2d 618 (1988)

Stop statute contemplates that person may be involuntarily stopped, and it was lawful for officer to use force to effect “stop.” State v. Hasan, 93 Or App 142, 760 P2d 1377 (1988)

Retention of fishing license during inquiry is not sufficient restraint on ability to leave to transform encounter into stop. State v. Hammond, 99 Or App 293, 781 P2d 1243 (1989), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant engaged officer in conversation and reminded officer of earlier arrest for driving while suspended, request by officer after checking license that defendant also show vehicle registration did not constitute stop. State v. Quigley, 100 Or App 418, 786 P2d 1274 (1990)

Where officer did not park in way that prevented defendant from leaving, patrol car’s headlights and spotlight did not transform encounter into stop, nor did request for license. State v. Calhoun, 101 Or App 622, 792 P2d 1223 (1990)

Officer’s request for identification did not transform encounter into stop when defendant stopped on his own and was not restrained from leaving. State v. Jensen, 102 Or App 323, 794 P2d 448 (1990)

Where officer requested and received driver license, stood by window of defendant’s vehicle and noted license information and immediately returned license, there was not sufficient show of authority to constitute stop. State v. Woods, 102 Or App 671, 796 P2d 1209 (1990)

Encounter with police officer was not stop when defendant was free to leave, and officer merely stood by restaurant booth, asked what defendant was holding in his hand and shined flashlight on defendant’s hand. State v. Morelli, 109 Or App 589, 820 P2d 1369 (1991), Sup Ct review denied

Where request made of passenger was consistent with alleged purpose of traffic stop, existence of other motive did not render request a “stop.” State v. Woods, 134 Or App 53, 894 P2d 511 (1995), Sup Ct review denied

Retention of valuable property extends duration of stop whether or not retention impairs mobility of stopped person. State v. Bailey, 143 Or App 285, 924 P2d 833 (1996)

Encounter becomes stop when restraint or interference with citizen freedom of movement is significantly out of ordinary. State v. Blair/Vanis, 171 Or App 162, 14 P3d 660 (2000), Sup Ct review denied

Police officer’s physical restraint of person does not convert stop into arrest. State v. McKinney, 174 Or App 47, 23 P3d 386 (2001), Sup Ct review denied

Where suspect is not handcuffed, restraint on suspect’s liberty consistent with officer’s need to control scene during investigation does not convert stop into arrest. State v. Werowinski, 179 Or App 522, 40 P3d 545 (2002), Sup Ct review denied

Where person displays identification to officer, but officer is not in possession of identification, no stop has occurred. State v. Cohan, 227 Or App 63, 204 P3d 816 (2009), Sup Ct review denied

Law Review Citations

57 OLR 195 (1977)

General definitions
“Victim” defined
Application to prior and subsequent actions
Parties in criminal action
When departures, errors or mistakes in pleadings or proceedings are material
When law enforcement officer may communicate with person represented by counsel
Appearances by simultaneous electronic transmission
Timeliness of criminal actions
Time limitations
When prosecution commenced
When time starts to run
Tolling of statute
Definition for ORS 131.205 to 131.235
Criminal homicide
Place of trial
Special provisions
Place of trial
Change of venue
Motion for change of venue
Change of venue for prejudice
Change of venue in other cases
Notification on change of venue
When change of venue is complete
Expenses of change
Attendance of defendant at new place of trial
Conveyance of defendant in custody after change of venue
Definitions for ORS 131.505 to 131.525
Previous prosecution
Previous prosecution
Proceedings not constituting acquittal
Definitions for ORS 131.550 to 131.600
Legislative findings
Right, title and interest in forfeited property vests in seizing agency
Property subject to forfeiture
Seizure of property subject to forfeiture
Status of seized property
Motor vehicle with hidden compartment
Recorded notice of intent to forfeit real property
Notice of seizure for forfeiture
Petition for expedited hearing
Order restoring custody of property after expedited hearing
Affidavit in response to notice of seizure for forfeiture
Prosecution of criminal forfeiture
Extent of judgment
Judgment of forfeiture
Equitable distribution of property or proceeds
Disposition and distribution of forfeited property when seizing agency not the state
Disposition and distribution of forfeited property when seizing agency is the state
Record keeping and reporting requirements
Prohibited conduct for purposes of instrumentalities of crime
Disposition of forfeited cigarettes
Definitions for ORS 131.605 to 131.625
Stopping of persons
Frisk of stopped persons
Detention and interrogation of persons suspected of theft committed in a store or unlawful operation of audiovisual device in a motion picture theater
Prevention by public officers
Dispersal of unlawful assemblages
Authority of Governor to enter into agreements with other states for crime prevention purposes
Definitions for ORS 131.705 to 131.735
Proclamation of emergency period by Governor
Exclusion from public property
Review of exclusion order
Authority to employ special agents
Presentment of facts to circuit court
Request that judge of another district conduct hearing
Appointment of special officers on finding that laws are not enforced
Qualifying of special officers
Compensation of special officers
Effect of appointment of special officers on salary of regular officers
Appointment of railroad police officers
Offer of reward
Entitlement to reward
Offer of reward for information on commission of criminal offense
Procedure for payment
Authority to order repayment of reward as part of sentence
Liability for medical expenses for person restrained, detained or taken into custody
Legislative findings
Law Enforcement Contacts Policy and Data Review Committee
Funding contributions
Moneys received
Policies and procedures prohibiting profiling
Complaints alleging profiling
Collection of officer-initiated stop data
Analysis of stop data to identify profiling
Training for law enforcement agencies
Green check means up to date. Up to date