Offenses Against Persons

ORS 163.305
Definitions


As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, unless the context requires otherwise:

(1)

“Forcible compulsion” means to compel by:

(a)

Physical force; or

(b)

A threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate or future death or physical injury to self or another person, or in fear that the person or another person will immediately or in the future be kidnapped.

(2)

“Mentally defective” means that a person suffers from a qualifying mental disorder that renders the person incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct of the person.

(3)

“Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered incapable of appraising or controlling the conduct of the person at the time of the alleged offense.

(4)

“Oral or anal sexual intercourse” means sexual conduct between persons consisting of contact between the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.

(5)

“Physically helpless” means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.

(6)

“Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or causing such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.

(7)

“Sexual intercourse” has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight; emission is not required. [1971 c.743 §104; 1975 c.461 §1; 1977 c.844 §1; 1979 c.744 §7; 1983 c.500 §1; 1999 c.949 §1; 2009 c.770 §1; 2017 c.318 §2; 2017 c.634 §17]
Note: Legislative Counsel has substituted “chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971,” for the words “this Act” in section 104, chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, compiled as 163.305 (Definitions). Specific ORS references have not been substituted, pursuant to 173.160 (Powers and duties of Legislative Counsel in preparing editions for publication). These sections may be determined by referring to the 1971 Comparative Section Table located in Volume 22 of ORS.

Notes of Decisions

Although evidence included a statement by victim made to cause defendant to believe that she was consenting to intercourse, but made with the ultimate motive of opening an avenue for her escape, evidence of rape was sufficient to submit to the jury. State v. Forsyth, 20 Or App 624, 533 P2d 176 (1975)

Under evidence that defendant intentionally touched victim's buttocks through clothing, whether such conduct constituted "sexual contact" of victim's "intimate parts" was question for jury. State v. Buller, 31 Or App 889, 581 P2d 1263 (1977)

Legislative intent is that separate sentences are permissible for rape and sodomy offenses arising out of same criminal episode. State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 605 P2d 671 (1980)

In prosecution for violation for ORS 163.425 (sexual abuse in first degree), evidence that defendant was being sexually fondled by his wife and that he attempted to expose himself to children in backseat of his car was probative of sexual arousal and therefore also probative of purpose under this section. State v. Fitch, 47 Or App 205, 615 P2d 372 (1980)

Under this section, any penetration is sufficient to sustain charge of rape. State v. Wolfe, 56 Or App 795, 643 P2d 404 (1982)

Statement by doctor that vagina and outer lips of genitalia of four-year old girl were markedly inflamed and irritated so that he thought it was quite possible she was sexually assaulted was sufficient evidence to establish that penetration "however slight" had occurred. State v. Hollywood, 67 Or App 546, 680 P2d 655 (1984), Sup Ct review denied

Where city's mandatory minimum penalty is harsher than state's for same conduct, city's penalty is invalid as incompatible with state criminal law under Article XI, Section 2 of Oregon Constitution. City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or 490, 714 P2d 220 (1986)

Sexual penetration is not necessary for conduct to constitute "deviate sexual intercourse." State v. Luttrell, 93 Or App 772, 764 P2d 554 (1988), Sup Ct review denied

For purposes of this section, "intimate parts" of body are parts subjectively intimate to person touched, and which are known by accused to be so or are area of anatomy that would be objectively known to be intimate by any reasonable person. State v. Woodley, 306 Or 458, 760 P2d 884 (1988)

Where jury was entitled to infer from evidence that defendant who was charged with rape in first degree subjected victims to "forcible compulsion," one element of charged crime in or within one mile of Multnomah County, Multnomah County trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's lack of venue argument and denying his motion or judgment of acquittal. State v. Sanarrita, 102 Or App 349, 794 P2d 457 (1990)

Ability of mentally defective person to appraise "nature" of conduct depends on person's understanding of physical aspects of conduct and ability to contemplate and assess moral quality of conduct. State v. Callender, 181 Or App 636, 47 P3d 514 (2002), Sup Ct review denied

Appraisal of conduct by person who is "mentally defective" means exercise of judgment and making of choices based on person's understanding of nature of person's own conduct. State v. Reed, 339 Or 239, 118 P3d 791 (2005)

"Intimate parts" of person means body parts that person ordinarily allows to be touched only by other people with whom person has close personal relationship marked by love, ardent liking or mutual cherishing. State v. Meyrovich, 204 Or App 385, 129 P3d 729 (2006), Sup Ct review denied

For act to constitute forcible compulsion by threat, person must directly and distinctly state or express to victim intent to inflict harm. State v. Magel, 246 Or App 725, 268 P3d 666 (2011)

To constitute "forcible compulsion" under section, physical force must be greater in degree or different in kind from simple movement and contact inherent in sexual contact at issue and must be sufficient to compel victim to submit to or engage in sexual contact against the victim's will. State v. O'Hara, 251 Or App 244, 283 P3d 396 (2012), Sup Ct review denied

Sixteen year old victim, who voluntarily consumed alcohol provided by defendant, and who defendant then sexually assaulted, was not "mentally incapacitated" at time of offense because victim consented to drinking alcohol. That victim was minor does not bear on victim's ability to consent to drinking alcohol. Burcham v. Franke, 265 Or App 300, 335 P3d 298 (2014)

Law Review Citations

68 OLR 255 (1989)

§§ 163.305 to 163.465

Notes of Decisions

Under evidence that defendant intentionally touched victim's buttocks through clothing, whether such conduct constituted "sexual contact" of victim's "intimate parts" was question for jury. State v. Buller, 31 Or App 889, 581 P2d 1263 (1977)

Genitalia and breasts are intimate parts as matter of law under this section, and undeveloped genitalia and breasts of children are included within definition. State v. Turner, 33 Or App 157, 575 P2d 1007 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

Rule that state is not permitted to introduce evidence of other crimes or bad acts solely to prove defendant acted as on prior occasions is strictly applied in sex crime cases, even those involving deviate sexual behavior, in so far as conduct with persons other than victim is concerned. State v. Sicks, 33 Or App 435, 576 P2d 834 (1978)

Law Review Citations

51 OLR 428, 518-522, 555 (1972)

Chapter 163

Law Review Citations

51 OLR 427-637 (1972)


Source

Last accessed
Jun. 26, 2021