Judgment and Execution

ORS 137.700
Offenses requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentences


(1)

Notwithstanding ORS 161.605 (Maximum terms of imprisonment for felonies), when a person is convicted of one of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(a) of this section and the offense was committed on or after April 1, 1995, or of one of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(b) of this section and the offense was committed on or after October 4, 1997, or of the offense described in subsection (2)(c) of this section and the offense was committed on or after January 1, 2008, the court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment listed in subsection (2) of this section. The person is not, during the service of the term of imprisonment, eligible for release on post-prison supervision or any form of temporary leave from custody. The person is not eligible for any reduction in, or based on, the minimum sentence for any reason whatsoever under ORS 421.121 (Reduction in term of incarceration) or any other statute. The court may impose a greater sentence if otherwise permitted by law, but may not impose a lower sentence than the sentence specified in subsection (2) of this section.

(2)

The offenses to which subsection (1) of this section applies and the applicable mandatory minimum sentences are:

(a)

(A) Murder in the second
degree, as defined in
ORS 163.115 (Murder in the second degree). 300 months

(B)

Murder in the first
degree, as defined
in ORS 163.107 (Murder in the first degree) 360 months

(C)

Attempt or conspiracy
to commit aggravated
murder, as defined
in ORS 163.095 (“Aggravated murder” defined). 120 months

(D)

Attempt or conspiracy
to commit murder
in any degree. 90 months

(E)

Manslaughter in the
first degree, as defined
in ORS 163.118 (Manslaughter in the first degree). 120 months

(F)

Manslaughter in the
second degree, as defined
in ORS 163.125 (Manslaughter in the second degree). 75 months

(G)

Assault in the first
degree, as defined in
ORS 163.185 (Assault in the first degree). 90 months

(H)

Assault in the second
degree, as defined in
ORS 163.175 (Assault in the second degree). 70 months

(I)

Except as provided in
paragraph (b)(G) of
this subsection,
kidnapping in the first
degree, as defined
in ORS 163.235 (Kidnapping in the first degree). 90 months

(J)

Kidnapping in the second
degree, as defined in
ORS 163.225 (Kidnapping in the second degree). 70 months

(K)

Rape in the first degree,
as defined in ORS 163.375 (Rape in the first degree)

(1)

(a), (c) or (d). 100 months

(L)

Rape in the second degree,
as defined in
ORS 163.365 (Rape in the second degree). 75 months

(M)

Sodomy in the first degree,
as defined in ORS 163.405 (Sodomy in the first degree)

(1)

(a), (c) or (d). 100 months

(N)

Sodomy in the second
degree, as defined in
ORS 163.395 (Sodomy in the second degree). 75 months

(O)

Unlawful sexual penetration
in the first degree, as
defined in ORS 163.411 (Unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree)

(1)

(a) or (c). 100 months

(P)

Unlawful sexual penetration
in the second degree, as
defined in ORS 163.408 (Unlawful sexual penetration in the second degree). 75 months

(Q)

Sexual abuse in the first
degree, as defined in
ORS 163.427 (Sexual abuse in the first degree). 75 months

(R)

Robbery in the first degree,
as defined in
ORS 164.415 (Robbery in the first degree). 90 months

(S)

Robbery in the second
degree, as defined in
ORS 164.405 (Robbery in the second degree). 70 months

(b)

(A) Arson in the first degree,
as defined in ORS 164.325 (Arson in the first degree),
when the offense represented
a threat of serious
physical injury. 90 months

(B)

Using a child in a display
of sexually explicit
conduct, as defined in
ORS 163.670 (Using child in display of sexually explicit conduct). 70 months

(C)

Compelling prostitution,
as defined in
ORS 167.017 (Compelling prostitution). 70 months

(D)

Rape in the first degree,
as defined in
ORS 163.375 (Rape in the first degree) (1)(b). 300 months

(E)

Sodomy in the first degree,
as defined in
ORS 163.405 (Sodomy in the first degree) (1)(b). 300 months

(F)

Unlawful sexual penetration
in the first degree, as
defined in
ORS 163.411 (Unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree) (1)(b). 300 months

(G)

Kidnapping in the first
degree, as defined in
ORS 163.235 (Kidnapping in the first degree), when the
offense is committed in
furtherance of the commission
or attempted commission of an
offense listed in subparagraph

(D)

, (E) or (F) of
this paragraph. 300 months

(c)

Aggravated vehicular
homicide, as defined in
ORS 163.149 (Aggravated vehicular homicide). 240 months

[1995 c.2 §1; 1995 c.421 §1; 1995 c.422 §47; 1997 c.852 §2; 2006 c.1 §1; 2007 c.867 §5; 2019 c.635 §10]
Note: Section 3 (2), chapter 1, Oregon Laws 2006, provides:
Sec. 3. (2) The amendments to ORS 137.700 (Offenses requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentences) by section 1 of this 2006 Act apply only to a person who was at least 18 years of age at the time the person committed an offense described in ORS 137.700 (Offenses requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentences) (2)(b)(D), (E), (F) or (G). [2006 c.1 §3(2)]
Note: 137.700 (Offenses requiring imposition of mandatory minimum sentences) to 137.707 (Mandatory minimum sentences for certain juvenile offenders waived to adult court) were enacted into law but were not added to or made a part of ORS chapter 137 or any series therein by law. See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes for further explanation.

Notes of Decisions

Pre 1995 Amendments

Filing of delinquency petition in juvenile court and seeking remand is not required where juvenile is charged with listed crime. State v. Lawler, 144 Or App 456, 927 P2d 99 (1996), Sup Ct review denied

Where juvenile is convicted of listed crime, ORS 161.620 prohibition against mandatory minimum sentence for juvenile does not apply. State v. Lawler, 144 Or App 456, 927 P2d 99 (1996), Sup Ct review denied

Minimum-sentence requirement does not violate constitutional provisions regarding equal protection, right of allocution, reformative purpose or separation of powers. State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 932 P2d 1145 (1997)

In General

Minimum-sentence requirement does not violate constitutional provision against disproportionate sentences. State v. George, 146 Or App 449, 934 P2d 474 (1997)

Prohibition against reducing incarceration period by allowing post-prison supervision does not conflict with Oregon Criminal Justice Commission rule requiring that incarceration period be followed by post-prison supervision period. State v. Lewis, 150 Or App 257, 945 P2d 661 (1997)

In cases involving consecutive sentences that include incarceration for described offenses, court must first impose mandatory minimum sentence prescribed for described offenses, then limit imposition of consecutive sentences for all other offenses to not exceed greater of mandatory minimum term of incarceration under this section or sentencing guidelines maximum available term for consecutive sentences. State v. Langdon, 151 Or App 640, 950 P2d 410 (1997), aff'd 330 Or 72, 999 P2d 1127 (2000); State v. Skelton, 153 Or App 580, 957 P2d 585 (1998), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Quintero, 160 Or App 614, 982 P2d 543 (1999); State v. Sullivan, 172 Or App 688, 19 P3d 1001 (2001)

Where mandatory minimum sentence exceeds maximum guidelines sentence, minimum sentence requirement supersedes sentencing guidelines limit. State v. Ferman-Velasco, 157 Or App 415, 971 P2d 897 (1998), aff'd 333 Or 422, 41 P3d 404 (2002)

Law Review Citations

82 OLR 1 (2003)

§§ 137.700 to 137.707

Notes of Decisions

Mandatory sentences for violent crimes do not violate Oregon Constitution Article III, section 1 (separation of powers); pre-1996 version of Article I, section 15 (no vindictive justice); or Article I, section 16 (cruel and unusual punishment). State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 949 P2d 724 (1997)

Sentencing disparity between crimes bearing mandatory minimum sentence and other crimes in same block of sentencing guidelines grid does not violate proportionality requirement of section 16, Article I of Oregon Constitution. State v. Ferman-Velasco, 333 Or 422, 41 P3d 404 (2002)

Mandatory minimum sentencing scheme does not violate guarantee under United States Constitution concerning cruel and unusual punishment, right to allocution or right to counsel. State v. Ferman-Velasco, 333 Or 422, 41 P3d 404 (2002)


Source

Last accessed
Jun. 26, 2021